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IN LUCE TUA
C omment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Q uotas in the Church
The temptation of which constitution-makers shou ld
be most aware is that of institutionalizing a mood. If
it is too much to ask of founders that they write for
the ages, it is not unreasonable to expect them . to do
their work with the long view in mind and with the
sense th at they shou ld avoid puuing in permanent
place the emhusiasms of the hour. The Comm iss ion
for a ew Lutheran Church (CNLC) , which has been
charged with the responsibility for drawing up the
framework for the proposed merger between the Lutheran Church in America, the American Lutheran
C hurch, a nd the Association of Evangelical Lutheran
C hurches, deserves not to be judged definitively o n its
work until its efforts are completed. Yet it appears on
at least o ne substantial point to have entrenched itself
in a position that has no apparent theological warrant
a nd that is rather the result of certain contemporary
sociol ogical fashions from which the church ought
properly to keep its distance.
According to the proposed CNLC constitution, the
new church will be required to arrange its e lected and
appoi nted structures virtua ll y from top to bottom in
ways that meet sex ual and racial/ethnic quotas: a ll
groups will have to includ e as many women as men
a nd at least I 0 per cent "persons of color and persons
whose primary la nguage is other than English." In its
la ud able desire to make the new church "an inclusive
fellowship," the CNLC has established a comprehensive quota system that is both unworkable and unwise
and that may very well work counter to the hig hminded intentions behind it.
Lutherans have always been suspicious of legalism,
and the quota system offers a good example of why
those suspicions shou ld be respected and heeded. The
Body of Christ needs to encourage and recognize the
diverse assets of the saints who compose it, but we
don't kn ow of any gifts of the spirit that are distributed accord in g to sex, race , or ethnicity. If Lutheran
Christians feel g uil ty about not having clone enough in
the past to recruit minorities or to listen to women's
voices, then the solution is a more inclusive evangelism
and a greater openness, not the imposition of a constitutiona l stra itjacket that makes no organizational or
theological sense and that wi ll only cause the church
to a ppear earnestly foolish. One imagines the good
Lutherans of, say, South Dakota scrambling desperApril, 1985

ately to find the requ1s1te number of Blacks or Hispanics to sit on every organizational body they create,
elected or otherwise-and, having imagined it, one
then wonders what the CN LC could have been thinking of in ordaining such a prospect.
The iron y is that the Commission has attached itself
to a n idea whose time has come and gone. Quota systems in th e secular world have recently come under
renewed legal and philosophical scrutiny, and they
have not weathered the scrutiny well. Th e courts and
political philosophers are on this issue just catching up
with the great majority o f Americans, who have from
the very beginning indicated their overwhelming opposition to quotas. As in the secular world, so in the
churches : one suspects that if the members of the
CN LC paid less attention to ideologica l activists and
more to the congregational rank-and-file, they would
learn that the true consensus o f the faithful on this
issue is at a co nsiderable remove from theirs. Quotas
in the church , a fter all, have even less to recommend
them tha n they do in the general society, where they
can at least make a n appeal, however ill-considered, to
ce rtain assumptions about interest-group politics. It is
difficult to understa nd why the church shou ld want to
burden itself with schemes borrowed from secularity
that the secularists themselves have begun to weary of.
Christian s have an imperative responsibility to address the consolations of the gospel to people of every
sort and condition. They also shou ld conduct their internal affairs in ways that reflect the equal and unforced dign ity that God's gracious love in Christ has
bestowed on a ll men a nd women. But quotas have
nothing to d o with any of that, and the church shou ld
flatl y and categoricall y reject the m .
~~

Special Notice
This is the second of the four issues of The Cresset
that the VU Alumni Association is sending free of
charge to alumni during 1985. The Alumni Association hopes that this experimental venture will provide
a. service to the alumni, the Cresset, and the University. Comments on this venture are invited and should
be addressed either to Walter Kretz.ma.nn, President of
the Alumni Association, or to Richard Koenig, Vice
President for Public and Alumni Affairs, at Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.
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Mark R. Schwehn

ACADEMICS AS A VOCATION
The Conundrum of Teaching and Research

"This is a terribly busy semester for me, so I do not
have any time to do my own work." This standard lament, expt·essed literally hundreds of times a day
among faculty members at colleges and universities
everywhere , must count as one of the strangest occupational complaints in the modern world. Imagine a
spot welder, after a record-breaking day on the assembly line, fretting with co-workers, over a cold pitcher
of Budweiser, about his lack of productivity. Fancy a
cardiac surgeon, after performing dozens of openheart operations over a three-month period , feeling
discouraged about her life because she 'just is not getting enough of her own work done." Among spot welders and heart surgeons, not to speak of lawyers,
butchers, bakers , and candlestick-makers, such a complaint, voiced under conditions of intensive labor, is
inconceivable. Among faculty members, it is expected.
Never mind the number of classes taught, courses prepared, papers graded, conferences held, and committees convened. Indeed, the m01·e these activities increase, the more deeply the depressing conviction sets
in: ''I'M JUST NOT DOING ENOUGH OF MY OWN
WORK."
One is tempted to ask, "Well then, whose work are
you doing?" To which question the response would be
instantly forthcoming: " You know what I mean; I'm
just not getting enough writing/composing/experimenting done. " Though this response seems to clear up a
certain amount of conceptual confus ion, it does so by
evading the depth grammar of the original remark. In
this case, we faculty do say what we mean: we think
our own work just is writing, composing, and experimenting. The mystery remains: how did we come to
talk and think this way? Or, to put matters a bit differ-

Mark R. Schwehn is a graduate of Valparaiso University
and is now Associate Pmfessor of Humanities in Christ College at the University. He is a regular contributor to The
Cresset.
4

ently, how is it that we labor with a bad conscience?
Pre liminary answers to these questions are not far to
seek. The fact that we facu lty tend to think that classroom teaching and co llegiality are strangely not part of
"our own work" is a tribute to the sociali zing power of
our graduate schools . There we learn, regardless of
our field of study, that research and publication constitute our task and that a ll other activities-teaching,
lecturin g, administering-somehow just go with the
territory. The feeble effort that most graduate schools
make to provide their students with "teaching experience" (it is rather like giving wou ld-be doctors training
in "bedside manner"; the training seems vaguely distasteful but it somehow must be done) merely reinforces the suspicion that pedagogy is not really a part
of one's work. Leaving aside the very important question of whether or not any teacher-training program
could be successful at the graduate level ("Tell me Socrates, can teaching be taught?"), the resu lts of five to
ten years of graduate training are unmistakable. Publication, graduate students discover, is the name of this
game. To expect a recent Ph.D . to think otherwise
would be the same as expecting a recent law school
graduate to think like an engineer.
These truths of academic life are remembered by almost everyone in theory but forgotten by almost
everyone in practice. We thus find it necessary to remind one another from time to time that teaching stu dents is really a part of "our own work." And we
shou ld find it necessary, especially in this time of widespread reappraisal of higher education in America , to
re-examine some of the basic assumptions that inform
our sense of academic vocation.
In 01·der to provoke such reflection , I offer here
Part I of a two-part essay that will explore some of the
problems that stem from current understandings and
misunderstandings of our calling as academics. In this
present part, l shall begin with some discomfiting facts
of contemporary academic life and then propose some
remedies for them. In the sequel next month, I shall
try to expose some of the roots of our current situaThe Cresset

tion by considering togethet- the classic analysis of
academics as a vocation, Max Weber's Wissenschaf! als
Beruf, and a contemporary work that impels us to reconsider both Weber and ourselves, Jaroslav Pelikan's
Jefferson Lectures, entitled The Vindication of Tradition.
II

Let us begin with some facts. A very large number
of tenured faculty, a number that constitute a substantial majority at several institutions of higher learning,
have not published , are not currently publishing, and
will not publish anything of scholarly significance during the course of their entire careers. Most of these
faculty should not be faulted for their lack of scholarly
productivity. On the contrary, they have for years
been doing the job they were hired to do: they counsel
students, teach multiple preparations, and st:rve on
any number of commillees. They should therefore be
honored, not scorned, when they do "their own work"
well.

A very large number of tenured
faculty, a number that constitute a
substantial majority at several
universities, have not published,
are not now publishing, and will not
publish anything of significance in
the course of their entire careers.
Another large group of faculty, a group that constitute a huge majority at institutions that emphasize
graduate training and at elite libet-al arts colleges, have
published significant work or fully intend to do so. An
important and increasingly large sub-group of this category , however, want to publish but cannot. They find
themselves at schools that exhort them to publish but
fail, for one reason or another, to provide them with
sufficient institutional support. Like their colleagues in
the first category, they teach multiple preparations,
sometimes numbering as high as four courses per
term, and they serve on numerous committees. But
unlike many of their colleagues in the first category,
they expect to publish , and they feel that publication
is expected of them. They therefore feel that they cannot do "their own work" well.
A very small third group deserve mention. They
teach four courses per term, serve on many committees, and somehow manage to be regularly productive
in terms of scholarly publication. They also tend to be
single and/or childless and/or divorced and/or premaApril, 1985

turely burned out, or heroic. They deserve our wonder, our praise, and/or our sympathy . But we cannot
recommend academic policy on the basis of their accomplishments.
Faculty in all three groups suffer from declining
morale. Many of the teachers in the first group have
recently been notified that publication is now expected
of them. But since they have not published for so
long, it is especially difficult for them to publish now.
So they continue to do "their own work" but with a
bad conscience. Faculty in the second group, except
for those who receive lavish doses of institutional support, cannot do what they judge to be "their own
work," so they become embittered and discouraged.
True, they were told as part of the terms of their appointment that publication was expected of them, but
they find that in order to publish , they must refuse
committee assignments and hence seem uncollegial,
cut back on teaching preparation and hence lose selfesteem, or find means to become independently
wealthy, an attractive but unlikely prospect. Faculty in
the third group sometimes incur the displeasure of
their colleagues. Since they are from time to time held
up as evidence for the claim that institutional expectations are not unreasonable (when in fact such expectations are often unreasonable) , they can become the undeserved recipients of faculty resentment that is better
directed elsewhere.
Administrative rhetoric , without major administrative policy shifts, is bound to worsen faculty morale in
the face of these difficulties. If administrators proclaim a new emphasis upon publication, they will antagonize everyone. Faculty in the first group will feel
as though the terms of their service have been
changed to their disadvantage. Faculty in the second
group, especially if they are untenured, as they often
are, will feel that an attractive expectation threatens to
become an inequitable burden in the absence of institutional support. It would seem that administrators,
in the face of declining enrollments and depleting revenues, are in an impossible situation. But they are not.
Ill

What then is to be done? At universities and elite
colleges where publication has always been expected
and support has always been forthcoming, there is no
systematic problem , only individual difficulties that can
be addressed on an ad hoc basis. At most other schools,
the administration should recognize the existence of at
least two groups and move instantly to reckon wisely
and publicly with this fact. Faculty in the first group
should continue to enjoy their privileges as teachers
and academic citizens. If they prove to be good teach5

ers and citizens, they should be warmly rewarded for
their work. They should not be expected to publish.
But they should be expected to do more classroom
teaching and more administrative work than the second group.
The second group should be expected to teach,
serve on committees, and publish. If they do all of
these th ings well, they should be warmly rewarded
also, no less and no more generously than the first
group. But they should not be expected to teach as
much or to serve on as many committees as the faculty
in the first group. Indeed, their teaching loads should
be reduced by at least one course per term, and their
committee assignments should be half of what might
fairly be expected of those in the first group. Finally,
these faculty should be eligible for the research support funds that the university has at its disposal. Two
groups: two sets of overlapping criteria for tenure,
promotion, and compensation. Divide and consider.
But how should the two groups be identified? By
self-selection. Let faculty select themselves into one of
these two groups during a period of one or two years.
During that time, departments should make explicit
the procedures for evaluating peers in both groups.
Faculty, in other words, should decide for themselves
what constitutes good teaching, good citizenship, and
good scholarship within their own respective disciplines. These criteria will vary, as they to some extent
should, from department to department. Nevertheless,
a university committee of faculty should review departmental guidelines to guard against inequities. At
the end of the self-selection period, the two groups
should go forth with mutual respect and support. The
variance in their gifts and preferences will have led to
a corresponding variance in their communal functions.
There ought to be no sense of second-class citizenship
in either direction.
Concurrent institutional adjustments will be required, but these will vary from school to school. Faculty who elect to publish while teaching fewer courses
will create a temporary shortage of course offerings.
In most cases, this will be itself a progressive step.
Many schools require too many credit hours and/01·
too many courses for graduation; hence, reduction in
these numbers will be an educational gain. (To
counter proposals such as these by observing that "outside agencies" require a certain number of courses and
credit hours is to abdicate faculty responsibility for determining what is the best educational program for
students. But this is the subject for another essay.)
Other measures in this context might include an increase in part-time faculty for service courses, the creation of post-doctoral teaching fellowship programs, or
the consolidation of several small lecture sections into

6

one large one. But since the feasibility and the prudence of any of these measures will vat·y from place
to place, the measures themselves should be determined locally.

IV
Several objections, some principled and others practical, will instantly be lodged against this proposal. The
most principled among them will doubtless assume the
following forms: the proposal seeks to separate the
teaching faculty from the research faculty, and such a
separation is misguided because impossible. "What
God has joined together, let not man put asunder."
But the proposal recommends no such thing. Rather,
it invites us to distinguish carefully among research,
publishing, and public-ation. All good teaching involves research and public-ation , making public the
best of one's own thoughts. Publishing is one form, the
most professional form , of public-ation, but research
and public-ation need not take the form of publishing.
They may very well, and they most often do, take the
form of good teaching.
No question has been as frequently and as futilely
debated among faculty as the question of the relationship between teaching and research. This debate has
been so sterile (it merely repeats itself in a thousand
forms) because it has been misconceived. Asking about
the relationship between good teaching and research is
like asking about the relationship between being single
and being a bachelor. All bachelors are single (as all
good teachers are researchers), but not all single persons (we may think of women and children) are
bachelors (not all researchers are teachers). lf we
would teach well, we must prepare for class by researching our subject. But though this exercise in
elementary logic solves the conceptual problem, the
practical problem remains: what is the difference between good teaching (and hence in part good research) and bad teaching?
To this question, we cannot provide a ready answer,
only ready procedures for answering it. Everything
that goes on in the classroom is already public-lectures, exams, discussions, course syllabi, reading lists ,
etc. All faculty members should therefore be expected
to present and to defend their course descriptions to
their colleagues. Peers should be able to determine
whether a given course on a given subject is conceptually clear, pedagogically sound, and well researched .
Over time, peers should also be able to determine
whether a given colleague is "keeping abreast of the
field " or merely repeating dated formulations. The
basis for such assessments would be public-ations such
as syllabi , reading lists, and course descriptions. The
The Cresset

forum for such deliberations would be faculty meetings. The mutual critiques of course descriptions
might even make faculty meetings intellectually
stimu lating. But we may be verging upon utopian fantasies here.

Many faculty see teaching as
essentially private. They therefore
are inclined to think of required
peer scrutiny of their course
descriptions and course reviews as
a kind of invasion of privacy.
The same conceptual confusion that stems from a
failure to distinguish among research, publishing, and
public-ation and that leads to pseudo-questions about
the relationship between teaching and research leads
also to resistance to procedures for distinguishing
good research and teaching from bad research and
teaching. Because many faculty think of publishing as
the only form of public-ation, they often think of everything else they do as strangely private. They are
therefore inclined to think of required peer scrutiny
of their course descriptions and their course reviews as
a kind of invasion of privacy. Such thinking is not only
misconceived, it is also obstructionist. It precludes the
possibilty of faculty members holding one another to
common, public standards of excellence in their vocations.
In sum, the major principled objection to dividing
faculties into the two groups outlined above can be
countered in both theoretical and practical terms. But
faculty must be ready and willing to submit all of their
public-ations for peer review in order to relieve the
suspicion that only publishing faculty are research faculty. Since the faculty in both groups will have to do
research in order to be good teachers, and since the
quality of their research will be regularly appraised by
peers on the basis of their public-ations, the two
groups will have everything important in common. Except, of course, publishing.
Before turning to a more extensive consideration of
the matter of publishing, we should note that sevet·al
questions and problems remain to be addressed by institutions that might choose to implement the system
outlined above. In the first place, these schools need
to decide for themselves the terms of new appointments. Should they be flexible , i.e., should new faculty
be permitted to select themselves into either one of the
two principal categories of faculty? Or should all new
appointments be placed into the category that includes
April, 1985

lighter teaching loads together with publishing requirements? I personally favor the latter course for
several reasons. I can imagine, however, that there
might be equally compelling reasons for the other and
more flexible set of terms. In short, this is again a
matter best left to local prudence.
The problem of small departments leads to another
set of dilemmas. If left to their own devices, small
academic units might easily become, under the proposed system, snug and parochial enterprises. Faculty
seminars designed to review critically the ideas of departmental colleagues might deteriorate rapidly into
mutual admiration societies (this might also happen in
large departments, of course, but the prospect seems
less likely). Institutions will need to guard against such
developments in any number of ways. They might, for
example, institute faculty exchange programs: these
tend to keep everyone involved alert and responsible.
They should invent several occasions for universitywide public-ation: lecture series, large courses that depend upon guest lecturers from within the institution,
staff-taught courses that involve faculty from a
number of departments, and more stringent departmental review procedures. Finally, they should insure that the college-wide or university-wide committees that review personnel decisions are the strongest
comm ittees at the institution. It is always easier and
fairer to improve quality within a customary set of expectations than it is to depart from custom by suddenly imposing a new set of them.

v
We turn finally to a more extensive consideration of
the subject of publishing, a subject that will engage us
in the remainder of this article and its sequel as well.
For the following argument might well be advanced
against the proposals above: publishing just is the defining characteristic of the academ ic vocation. And by
publishing we should refer not simply to some species
of the genus public-ation (a making public) but to original research that advances the progress of one's discipline. Publishing therefore is that activity by which the
fruits of one's original research are placed before one's
peers for their inspection and judgment. It means nothing less than the placement of one's work in the
leading journals of one's discipline. If this line of argument is correct, we have been wrong to relieve some
faculty of their obligation to publish, for in doing so,
we have relieved them or permitted them to relieve
themselves of their vocation, of what is truly "their
own work."
The locus classicus for the elucidation of this understanding of the academic vocation is Max Weber's fa7

mous 1918 address delivered at Munich University
and entitled Wissenschaft als Beruf 1 Abandoning his ordinarily dry and measured style as the occasion moved
him to do so, Weber issued a series of impassioned
and uncompromising statements about the character
of the academic calling. "Whoever lacks the capacity to
put on blinders, so to speak, and to come up to the
idea that the fate of his soul depends upon whether or
not he makes the correct conjecture at this passage of
his manuscript may as well stay away from academics.
He will never have what one may call the 'personal experience' of academics. Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider; without this passion, this 'thousands of years must pass before you
enter into life and thousands more wait in silence'-according to whether or not you succeed in making this
conjecture; without this, you have no calling for
academics and you should do something else. For nothing is worthy of man as man unless he can pursue
it with passionate devotion." 2 Weber's address articulates what remains today as the academic ethosY
We might be tempted to raise two preliminary
points in response to the Weberian account of the
academic vocation and in defense of our own recommendations above. First, we could observe that even if
Weber is correct, the facts of our present situation as
outlined in section II above are unlikely to disappear
in the near future. "La theorie, c'est bon, rnais ca n'ernpeche pas d'exister."~ We began with the facts and attempted to make the best of a complicated situation.
Weber was attempting to remind his audience of the
principles that justified academic life as it was then
being lived in 01·der to forestall immediate threats to
its continued existence on those tet·ms.
Second, we might argue that the twentieth-century
emphasis upon publishing has had a number of unsalutary consequences, leading, as it has, to a good
deal of drivel on the one hand and to a good deal of
1

Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in H . H. Genh and C.
Wright Mills (trans. and eels.), From Max Weber: Essa}s iu SociolOfD (Oxford University Press: ew York, 1977), 129-156. Genh
and Mills have translated wissenschaft as "science." Because "science" in the U.S. context is often understood to mean simply
"nanu·al science," and since the German word has a much wider
range of reference, I have translated wissenschafl as "academ ics."
Weber was speaking about and he referred to all of the
academic disciplines in his 1918 address.
2
/bid. , 135.
1
: "The Repon of A Study Group of the International Council o n
the Future of the University" has •ecently been published
under the title The Academic Ethic (University of Chicago Press:
Chicago and London, 1984). This report, prepared and issued
under the direction of Edward Shils, is Orten quite consciously
Weberian in its views.
4
T his remark of Charcot's was one of Sigmund Freud's favorite
phrases. It means simply, "The theory is good, but it does not
prevent the thing from existing."
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fetishism on the other. I taught for a time at an institution of higher learning in California where the
faculty had grown quite shameless about padding their
lists of publications with all sorts of shallow entries.
They could do this, because the sheer volume of print
made it impossible for their colleagues to read their
work. Thus, "weighing" a colleague's publications
meant quite literally placing them on the scales.
"Measuring" a colleague's intellectual stature meant
quite literally counting the number of column inches
occupied by his or her list of writings. At the other extreme, I have known of several colleagues who have
failed to get tenure because their manuscripts, though
complete and deemed "brilliant," were not accepted
for publication in time for the tenure review. "We
have come," one of my former colleagues once confessed to me, "to place an inordinately high premium
upon bindings."
The common abuse of certain principles or practices
is , however, no argument against them. If we would
truly understand the roots of our present situation, we
must consider Weber's account of the academic vocation with full seriousness. The stakes of inquiry are
very high here , for they amount to nothing less than
an answer to the most urgent question we academics
face. What really is our vocation ?
This question ought to be even more urgent for
those academics who teach at church-•·elated schools.
For many of us, Webe•·'s claim that the "fate of our
souls" (he was not speaking figuratively here) depends
upon whether or not we make correct conjectures at
critica l junctlll·es in our published work will seem at
least mildly unsettling. Indeed , Weber and his heirs
have consistently appropriated religious images and
concepts in order to characterize the essential features
of life within the modern, secular academy ('vocation'
is itself arguably one such concept). In doing this, the
Weberians have accomplished a kind of "transvaluation of values" that has gone unnoticed and hence unexamined during the course of this century.
One recent instance of this "tra nsvaluation " might
serve to illustrate how subtly this process works. Clifford Geertz, who everywhere avows the great influence that Weber has had upon his own thought, has
recently attempted to suggest an outline for an
"ethnography of modern thought." 5 He argues that we
need to think about the peculiar career patterns that
characterize academic disciplines in order to understand both the modern academic "cast of mind" and
certai n academic rituals, such as professional meetings.
5

Clifford Geertz, "The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnography of Modern Thought," in Geertz, Local Knowledge: FttrliLPr
Essa}S in fnl erjnelive AnlhropolofD (Basic Books: New York, 1983),
147- 163.
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He observes, for example, that, unlike the police who
move upward through the ranks after being inducted
at the bottom, and unlike Roman Catholic clerics who
often "stay at the same general level of the hierarchy
for thirty or forty years," academics begin "at the
center of things" and then "move toward the edges."
Thus, "the majority of [academics] follow a career pattern in which they are for several years at the perceived heart of things and then, in differing degrees
and with different speeds, are, in the jargon, 'downwardly mobile'-or, again, at least perceive themselves
to be . ... To study English history at Princeton and to
teach it at Louisiana State can lend a particular tone
to your life." 6
ote now the phrase that Geertz uses to describe
this eccentric career pattern: he calls it the "exiles
from Eden syndrome." 7 Let us resist the temptation to
wonder about the kind of mind that would think of
places like New Haven, Connecticut and Hyde Park of
Chicago as Edens. Let us grant that Geertz simply
means to suggest that, for scholars, being around great
libraries, laboratories, and bookstores is like being in a
kind of Paradise. Even so, when we turn to Genesis 2,
we find there a description of life in the Garden of
Eden that would seem to be the antithesis of life at
(let's make it tough) the University of California,
Berkeley. If we must find a biblical story that somehow
prefigures the character of life at a modern research
university , we would be best advised to turn, not to the
Garden of Eden, but to the Tower of Babel.
We might even argue that the modern university
arose in part as a direct repudiation of the world of
Genesis 2. In Genesis 2, for example, creatures and
Creator live in full communion with one another.
Modern academic life, by contrast, advances the process of "intellectualization" that Weber described so
grandly as the "disenchantment of the world."!! In
Genesis, the human names the animals for the purpose of finding suitable companionship. At modern
research universities, humans name and classify in
order ultimately to increase the measure of power that
they can exert over nature. The will to companionship
has become the will to domination and control. In the
Genesis story, the serpent first suggests that the humans might aspire to deity. Just such an aspiration
seems to characterize the spirit of much of modern
academic life. According to Weber, we in the modern
world "can, in principle, master all things by calculation. " 9
Even if the modern university represents the finest
achievement of post-lapsarian humankind , it cannot be

called Eden, unless one is seeking, however inadvertently, to transmute the sacred into the secular.
Faculty members at church-related schools ought to
be at least mildly disturbed by all of this, and they
should therefore approach the subject of publishing
with special caution. Must a defense of publishing depend upon a transvaluation of values like the one that
Weber achieved while defending his view of specialized, original research and publication as the academic
task? To what extent was Weber speaking only for
himself, and to what extent did he manage to discern
accurately the ethos of the modern academy? In sum,
what were the theoretical and historical contexts that
conditioned the modern emphasis upon publishing of
the kind that Weber and his heirs promote? And on
what terms, if any, can we join with the Weberians in
claiming that our calling as academics requires of us
publication first and last?
These and related questions must be explored before we can begin seriously to reconsider the place of
publishing in our lives as academics. We shall therefore turn to them in the next installment of this essay.

••
••

To the Holy Ghost, the Comforter
I pull you up around my throat,
you crazy-quilted bird who tucks
her feathers inside; outside fall
rattles our town like chicken bones.
Sometimes your coiling quills will catch
fire in the sunlight, spin me up
to perch where I can see the flame
kindling in a daughter's hair.
And sometimes flapping like the ghost
of spring through winter, you inspire
my cautious flesh to imitate
your abandon as you dive, display.
So in this flightless night when dreams
skitter away like fallen leaves,
brood in my bony branches, you
comforter, cover my nakedness.

Mark T rechock
';Geenz. 158-159.
7
fbid ., 159.
"Weber, 155.
''Ibid. , 139.
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Jeff Smith

REAGAN'S MISSIONARY DREAM
The Meaning behind Star Wars

Ronald Reagan has become a misswnary since his
re-election. It was widely thought that he would enter
his final term concerned about his "place in history, "
and indeed, he seems to have a dream of something
that he thinks will secure that place. He spoke of the
dream in his Inaugural addre s, announced a big
budget increase for it, and ent his defense secretary
to make straight its way among the European allies
(who are very much preoccupied with the whole matter as I write). Reagan's self-proclaimed mission is nuclear disarmament. But the peculiar means for this,
and the dream, is his so-called Strategic Defense Initiative-"Star Wars."
It's worth listening closely to Reaga n's arguments for
this plan. I don 't say this only for the obvious reason
that he's the man in charge. Often, in fact, it's better
to discount a political leader's statements and focus instead on what he's really up to. But Ronald Reagan is
different. He seems to say what he thinks or rather,
he doesn 't think about what to think. As a result, his
pronouncements are a good index to what lots of
people may believe but be unwilling or unable to say.
For instance, if Reagan is asked what he thinks
about Armageddon-a popular idea in some circleshe simply answers. We saw this during the second of
last fall's debates. Reagan wears his Hal Lindsay on his
sleeve. The most remarkable thing is that somehow he
can do this and not be seen as committing the everdreaded "gaffe."
Since we're talking mission work, let's point up that
example a bit with an interesting contrast. Now all else
being equal, presumably one would prefer a President
who had occasionally desired women over one who
saw the "prophecies coming together, " as Reagan put
it, and who seemed to think Judgment Day might be

Jeff Smith, a graduate of Valparaiso University, is currently
studying at the Briti h Film Institute on a Fulbright Fellowship. H e is a regular contributor to The Cresset.

10

a kick. Yet when Jimmy Carter made the utterly innocuous declaration of "lust in his heart" in 1976, the
remark was rammed down his throat by the media.
Unlike Armageddon, lust was a gaffe. And there is an
additional irony here. The phrase Carter chose reflected his genuine religiosity: It is a Biblical allusion
and a commonplace of evangelical piety. Reagan, on
the other hand , was quoted last summer calling " Man
does not live by bread alone" an "old saying." If the
Great Lion of God of 1984 were once to flip open his
Bible a few pages shy of Apoca lypse, perhaps he
would discover that these are, rather, words of Jesus
himself from the Gospel of Luke. Not that the millions
who took Reagan to embody God and country noticed ,
or cared, that he didn't know this. ( or, of course, did
the media. Too much trouble to check a Concordance.) This is interesting in itself, but it's in terms of
Star Wars, oddly enough, that it all really starts to
make sense.
Reagan presents Star Wars as an alternative to
MAD-"Mutual Assured Destruction"-which he correctly points to as having rather serious philosophical
flaws. And let's give him that much credit. It doesn't
take a systematic thinker to see that threatening to
blow up millions of people i morally on the dubious
ide. The nonsense comes in when Reagan says that
MAD is the essence of current U.S. policy. That claim
is , in fact, a lie, or would be if Reagan had any real
knowledge of what he was talking about. (If the media
knew anything about the issue , they would be compelled to call it a gaffe.)
As has been amply documented in recent years, official U.S. nuclear policy has little to do with any allout, MAD-type deterrent. It has much more to do
with developing and extending a nuclear warfighting
capability. (If they shoot at us, we shoot at them. If
they nuke us just a little, we nuke them a little. If they
nuke us a lot, we nuke them a lot, or better yet, we
nuke their nukes first so they can't nuke us at all. This
is called "proportionate retaliation ," "force-matching,"
or " flexible response." That makes it sound like it's

still so me kind of deterrence , though to the prosaica ll y
minded it may look like p lain old war.)
Some critics of Star Wars a re aware of the reality of
our policy. Being aware of it, they oppose the initiative. T hey don't see Star Wars, as Reagan does, as a
break with past policy, a grand new direction in meeting the nuclear threat. In stead , they see it as a chillin g
continuation of recent policy-the "extension of the
arms race into space" and so forth. Nonetheless,
Reagan reall y seems to believe it is a grand, exciting
new idea. Th is is another way of saying that his Sta•Wars vision must be viewed as something affirmativea genuine dream.
T he dream is of a world protected against nuclear
missiles by highly sophisticated anti-missile weapons,
perhaps using laser beams, which presumably would
be deployed in space . There are both political and
"strategic" objections to this idea. The major political
objection is that Star Wars is "destabi lizing." In the
short term at least, pursuit of it threatens treaties,
raises questions about U .S. intentions, and generally
makes everyone nervous. Reagan has a reply to this
objection , a reply wh ich, however, is too bizan-e in
terms of his other stated views for us to make sense
of at this point. So let's focus on the strategic objections.

The major strategic objection to Star
Wars is that it just won't work. The
dream of protection can't be realized.
T hese are simp ler anyway. The major strategic objection to Star Wars is that it just won't work. The
ch-eam can never be realized . The other side, say critics, can always overcome any anti-missile defense by
using decoys or extra missiles to "saturate" it.
There is also a strategic reply to this objectionnamely, that the system doesn't have to be perfect to
raise doubts in the enemy's mind , and perhaps deter
him from an attack. Maybe that is correct. But what
is interesting is that it is not the reply given by
Reagan . Reagan doesn 't appeal to technical or strategic
concepts. Instead, when confronted with anti-Star
Wars criticism, he appeals to grand views of history
and of the nature of technology itself.
T he strategic objection to Sta r Wars is really a restatement of a historic fact, the basic tenet of life in
the nuclear age: We can no longer protect our homelands against weapons of war. This is a fact, and a
view of history, that Reagan simply doesn't accept.
"There has never been a weapon invented in the history of man ," Reagan said during that second Presi-
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dential debate, "that has not led to a defensive , a
counte•--weapon." Now, there are those who think that
Reagan 's unselfconscious style mea ns that he just
spouts anything that occurs to him . But when he offered this defense of Star Wars, he was in fact expressin g views of lon g standing. During his I 980 Presidential cam paign , candidate Reagan said to Robert
Scheer:
I think the thing that struck me [while visiting North American Air Defense headqu arters] was th e irony that here, with
this great technology of o urs, we ca n do all of this [sophisticated tracking] yet we cannot sto p an y of the weapons th at
are coming a t us. I don't think the re's bee n a time in history
when there wasn 't a defense against some kind of thrust,
eve n bac k in th e o ld-fas hion ed days when we had coast a rtille ry that would stop invadin g ships if they came.

As President, Reaga n gave an interview to Japanese
television in which he spontaneously contrasted nuclear war with "civilized " warfare of the past, urging
"Let us, at least, get back to where we once were."
And today Hedrick Smith reports that Reagan 's real
e nthusiasm for the project comes across even in his
"bod y language." What Star Wars represents for
Reagan is something close to his heart. (Hence it
should come as no surprise that he now says it will not
be a "bargaining chip .")
Robert Scheer is correct to note that Reagan differs
from most world leade rs in longing not for an end to
war itself. Indeed , Reagan believes that wars of the
past were "civilized." Instead , what he longs for is , as
Scheer put it even before Star Wars , "the ultimate
a ntiballistic missile." Reagan, says Scheer, expresses a
"wistful desire for the relative simplicity of the past
a nd a belief in the ca pacity of industrial technology to
solve any problem. "
Scheer ca ll s this wistfulness another example of
Reaga n's "d etachment from reality." And if Star Wars
really is not technically feasible , then maybe Scheer is
right. But ignoran ce and detachment won't do as explanations of an enthusiasm like Reagan 's. Scheer himself makes this plain : Wh at we have in Reagan are
positive beliefs a nd desires that cr y to be understood,
especially if they reflect urges widelv present in our
culture.
In an earlier article ("Dark Truths: Prophecy,
Ethics, and the Nuclear Peril," October, 1984), I spoke
of what seemed to be one of our culture's positive beliefs, "the belief that the U.S. can't produce anything
truly evil." Reaga n's "belief in the capacity of industrial
technology" could well be the result of some more
fundamental belief like this one. It is a commonplace
in America to ass ume that technology, the product of
"A merican ingenuity" and backbone of the country's
strength , is inhere ntly good. Or, at least, it contains
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values within itself: It is not simply a neutral force that
does good or evil depending on the policies it's made
to serve. According to this view, technological "progress" is just that-the phrase is a redundancy, really.
Also, technical and social progress are one and the
same: we have the latter because of the former.
"They" who look after us on ly bother to innovate for
the sake of making life easier.
uclear weapons threaten to undermine this faith.
Here is enormous, quantum technological "p•-ogress"
in another U.S. -led field. Yet it seems threatening and
sinister. To this, Reagan (and undoubtedly others)
brings the touching faith that even nuclear weapons
can be made to fit the classic pattern of technical development, the pattern Reagan outlin ed for Scheer. 1f
they can, then their defeat is possible through further
innovation. Which is to say, it remains possible to believe that technology equals progress equals an Im proving quality of life.

spoiled landscape which machinery was apt to destroy,
so also, with its natural defenses, it was once the ultimate securable homeland which nuclear weapons have
placed under threat. To a certain sort of mind , one
with a clear memory of the days when "war" occurred
at sea or in Europe, it must seem like abject surrender
to even contemplate a strategy like MAD, which perm its and even demands a permanent threat to the
American homefront.

But be lief in technology seems on ly part of the
Reagan credo. The other part is that "wistfu l desire"
for the simplicity of the past, the "old-fashioned days,"
as Reagan puts it. There is nothing strange about such
a des ire in terms of American cul tura l history. Americans have always responded to advancin g technology
with nostalgia for earlier times. As the machine crept
into the garden-to borrow terms from Leo Marx, a
literary historian-the sense of loss of what had once
seemed a pristine, pastOJ-al landscape became the subject of our greatest literature.
What is noteworth y about Reagan is that he
dovetails some such "pastoral" outlook with his belief
in the beneficence of certain kinds of technology, the
"industrial technology" referred to by Scheer. T he earlier times to which Reagan harks back are not pretechnological or agrarian, but merely pre-nuclear. Yet
it certainly is still some sort of romanticism. "Romanticism" used to look back nostalgicall y to the Middle
Ages, with their codes of heroism and chivalry. What
Reagan 's way of thinking suggests is that today it looks
back nostalgically to the days of early modern warfare.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wars
cou ld be fought on technologized forward battlefronts, while homelands lay secure in the rear. The
distinction between front and rear is precisely what
nuclear weapons obliterate. T hey dump "war" all over
the homeland. Reagan 's reaction to this is precisely
parallel to the reaction of earlier American romantics
to the onset of industry which seemed to obliterate the
safe boundaries between country and city and to
dump "the city" all over the landscape.
It is easy to see why a vision of "good " war and
technology wou ld be especia ll y hard for an American
to let go of. Just as America was once the ultimate un-

The essence of the romantic impulse is its refusal to
endorse such a surrender to technology. And in this
respect, despite its anti-industrial roots, Reaganesque
romanticism squares very nicely with Reaganesque
faith in technology, which holds that technology must,
virtuall y by definition , serve human good, and certainly American good. (Gee, as Reagan might say,
aren't those one and the same?) To be nostalgic for
the period of early modern warfare is to be nostalgic
for the era when American technology established this
country's world dominance. Once, when America was
thought of as a garden, romantic yearnings were pastoral. But now that technology has identified the country with "progress," romance harks back to the days of
supposed ly be neficent industry. Once, any machinery
seemed an uncontrollable threat to what the country
stood for. Now, machine•-y is the very basis of the
country's meaning and direction, and only certa in nuclear technology remains untamed-partl y because it
calls into question the meaning we've assigned to
machinery in general.
Reagan holds a view which cannot conceive of
Americans surrendering before technology (as by
MAD), and more importantly, which greatly fears
what technology becomes if it is thus transgressed in
its very nature. 1 think "fear" is the correct word
there. Reagan really does hate and fear nuclear
weapons. And his hatred an d fear of them is what
makes him want to build more and more at an everfaster rate .
The logic there is not as obscure as it might seem.
In fact, in the religious vein in which this discussion
began , we might call what Reagan poses f01- us a
"paradox." Here is how to make sense of it. If you see
a particular device as being the devil's work-evi l-you
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President Reagan really does hate
and fear nuclear weapons. And his
hatred and fear of them is what
makes him want to build more and
more at an ever-faster rate.

The C1·esset

will naturally expect it to serve the devil better than it
serves you. If the device in question is nuclear
weaponry and the devil is your earthly enemy (recall
that Reagan's Russia is the "focus of evil"), then you
will always be plagued by the fear that your enemy's
weapons will work and yours won't. Hence you will
never feel secure with what you've got. Every weapon
you acquire falls clown thi bottomless well of Manichean pessimism.
The relentless nuclear innovation that continues
today rests precisely on such pessimistic assumptions.
It appeals to "worst-case analyses" in which, for instance, the Russians are able to launch flawless first
strikes against our land-based missiles, while we simultaneously discover that our air- and sea-based missiles
are somehow useless for retaliation. Reagan himself is
especially enthusiastic about this sort of thinking. Despite access to better information, he has given voice
to elaborate fantasies not only of U.S. vulnerability,
but also of Russian invincibility. These include I 00 per
cent "har-dening" of Soviet industry against attack, a
paranoic vision beyond the imagination even of the
CIA.
The problem has been that worst-case analysis presents itself as mere prudence and rationality-so convincingly, in fact, that even its critics have met it on
that ground and tried to argue it away rationally. The
wonderful thing about Reagan is that in his enthusiasm and childlike candor he articulates impulses
underlying this sort of analysis, impulses which are not
rational at all but rather emotional and even spiritual.
Seeing this, it's possible to recognize that the fervor
Reagan brings to Star Wars is all of a piece with the
fervor he brings to his "windows of vulnerability," and
to "limited nuclear war" in Europe, and to his demonic attitude toward Russia. And it is this fervor that
really does make him something of a "religious" man,
and that allows people to see him as such, even if he
doesn't know a Bible ver-se when one of them bites
him. (Mild, unfervent Walter Monclale, though the son
of a minister, came off as downright irreligious by
comparison.) Most importantly, Reagan's fervor makes
him religious in the same way as his armies of true believers, most of whom couldn't care less about the
Satan of tradition but who react with shrill terror-not
altogether unjustified-at the forces of social and
technological modernity that seem to have clashed all
their old certainties.
Acwally the cultural impulses for which Reagan is
the reigning spokesman certainly touch many others
beyond his core of fundamentalist supporters. Precisely because they are spiritual without being
explicitly religious, these impulses can shape the outlook of people who don't consciously cleave to any
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given creed. It is just this sort of spiritual fear and desire in the culture at large for which we should be on
the lookout. Otherwise, even if we make sense of the
thinking of a given leader, we have no explanation for
the support he continues to get and no idea what to
do once he passes from the scene.
Not that the way is now immediately made clear. To
many antinuclear writers, and others unwilling to wait
around for Star Wars to save us, Reagan's whole approach to these questions must seem, in this light,
even more alien than they thought. Here is a man who
simply cannot share their view that salvation from nuclear weapons requires a different kind of politics. For
Reagan, the solution has to be technological rather
than political, because only a new, beneficent technology can redeem technology's own stained reputationcan preserve technology's virtue, as it were, from violation by the nuclear monster. Reagan doesn't look to
Star Wars to save us directly so much as he looks to
it to save technology, which in turn would restore to
us our old, familiar world. That bizarre reply of
Reagan's to the political objections against Star Wars
makes sense in terms of this hope. In a world restored
to "good" technology, we, the good guys, are safe. We
win. Our new, manifestly virtuous technology can,
therefore, even be given to the enemy: its inherent
goodness will keep it on "our side." And that of course
is Reagan's pr-oposal, to share Star Wars with the Russians. This may be less the fairy tale it sounds like than
just a dream dreamt a bit too long.
Anyway, Reagan's mission gives rise to plenty of
ironies besides that one. The President's nostalgia and
fear of technology have made him a (very successful)
champion of high-tech innovation and of ever more
sophisticated hardware. His wish to see us not surrender our destiny has led him to place our fate in the
hands of bureaucratic systems with an internal
momentum of their own. His Manichean sense of the
special nature of nuclear weapons has led him to pile
up yet more of them, adding to a crushing load from
which mankind may never escape.
All very ironic. But that is the nature of any complex cultural belief, and the reason why the categories
in my previous essay are only scant beginnings. In trying to map any particu lar mind, especially Reagan's,
the temptation is to look once into the murky depths
and just write, " Here Be Dragons." But even if tentatively, we must try to do better. For in succumbing to
all his ironies, Reagan merely points up what our culture is about. That much, at least, we should have
learned since November. After all, it was that "gaffeless" debate, the one in which Reagan discussed both
Star Wars and Armageddon, that most observers believe sealed his overwhelming victor-y.
Cl
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William Olmsted

ARCADIAN TRANSMIGRATIONS
One-Way Traffic in the Arts

The muse um-like the ostrich, the dodo , and the
auk-has wings but ca nnot fl y. It would be malicious
to pursue this analogy very far, but the winged
museum shares with the flightless bird a liability to extinction. The spatial division of the museum in to separate wings according to a taxonomic scheme is a fairly
recent development, a response to practical a nd intellectual concerns which first arose in the late eighteenth
century. 1 The creation of na tional museums , coupled
with the redirection of philanthropy into cultural projects, led to the centralized accumulation of art on a n
unprecedented scale. This spelled the demise of the
mode of display which had been a ppropriate to the
small, private muse um with its jumbled array of esthetic bric-a-brac reflecting the tastes of a n individual
collector. The sheer size of these new collection s made
larger buildings necessary and , at the same time, rendered it impossible for the average spectator to view
everything. Disorder-now on a grand scaleprompted critics like Theophile Gautiet· to call for the
arrangement of works in terms of their period, genre,
and country of origin. 2 What resu lted is the familiar
organization of wings and rooms into multiply-defined
collections, e.g., nineteenth-ce ntury French paintings,
ceramics from the Sung Dynasty, colo nial American
furniture. The modern museum began to function like
that other child of the Enlightenment, the encyclopedia.
Like the use r of an e ncyclopedia, the spectator cou ld
go to a particula r place with the expectation of finding
concise but representative inform atio n on the subject
of his or he r inte rest. And in spite of the categorica l
differentiations imposed by the winged museum , the
visitor re mained free to wander and to browse. No
matter that the im agination of the spectator h ad bee n
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constricted b y the a nalytical procedures of specialized
curators a nd art historians: by the simple expedient of
viewing some wings and overlooking others, the
museum-goer could imaginativel y construct a personal
synthes is of different artworks .:~ The museum as encyclopedia, even if every "e ntry" were an exercise in
pedantry, still permitted th e spectator a liberty of
selection and combination-whether to gratify a particular taste (" I know what I like") or to a rticulate a
cosmopolitan vision of "a muse um without walls," as
Andre Malraux put it.
The first symptom of the winged museum's mortality or, more exactly, of its evolutionary supercession
appea red in 1959 with the comp letion of Frank Lloyd
Wright's last major work, the Solomon R. Guggen heim
Museum. '1 The main gallery'(if it can be so ca ptioned)
1

The best short history of the museum's development from the
scu lpture ga lle ri es of Renaissance co llectors to "mac hin es for
viewing pictures·· (Harold Rosenberg's phrase) is Niko laus Pevsne r , A History of Building Types (Princewn, 1970), ch. 8.
2
Gautier's call for a museum in which the arra ngement o f pa intings wou ld reflect a continuous cha in of art history first appeared in La Presse, I 0 February 1849, in a n articl e o n "La
Mu see ancien,'' later reprinted as "Etudes sur les 1usees in
Tableaux a Ia plume (Paris, no date). By 1856 some t·e-organization of the Lo u v1·e alon g these lin es had occu rred, and Gautier
ex pressed relief th at Mantegnas and Lorrains were no longet·
displayed in close proximity. See " Les Musees" in Pm-is et les
parisiens au X IX siecle (Paris, 1856), pp. 239-40. For a co ntrasting
co ntempora ry view, condemning systematiciry in genera l and
the notion of an-h istorica l progress in particular, see Cha rles
Baudela ire, "L'Exposition universelle de 1855," Oeuvres compl~tes
(Paris, 196 1), pp. 953-60.
1
: For a similar notion of th e museum as catalogue, see Robert
Harbison, Eccentric Spaces (New York. 1980), ch. 8. Unfortunately, Harbison regards the win ged museum as promoting
vague ge nera li zations rather than precise (if infinite) comparisons a mo ng di verse artwor ks. On the encyclopedia as a regu lative id ea for a virtua ll y infinite network of semantic interp reta nts, see Umbe rto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language
(Bloomington , 1984), ch. 2. Readers of Eco's rece nt bestse ller,
The Name of the Rose, will recall th a t novel's image o f the library
as laby rinth (i.e. , a n e ncyclopedia) which , like the winged
mu seu m, ca n't be reduced to a si ngle set of mean in gs.
1
The bui ldin g has received a great deal of attention from
Wright's fans a nd detractors a like . A straightforward, essen ti all y
neutra l acco unt of the Museum can be found in Michael
Brawne, The New Mu.wum (New York, 1965), pp. 10- 14 , 142-45.
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bears some resemblance to a screw or inverted turban.
Theoretically, the spectator can embark upon this
spiralling ramp either at the top or at the bottom of
the helix; in practice, however, visitors are encouraged
to take an elevator to the top and then to descend in
narrowing curves to the bottom of the ramp. Paintings
are displayed at regular intervals on the outer wall,
while what amounts to a half-wall on the inside of the
curve is the on ly thing separating the viewer from the
airy vortex of the gallery's inner space.

What seems to me most significant
about the Guggenheim is its rigorous
organization of the spectator's
mobility and, indirectly, the viewing
process. No aimless wandering here!
I will not comment on Wright's intentions or the
symbolism of his design. What seems to me most significant about the Guggenheim is its rigorous organization of the spectator's mobility and, by extension, the
viewing process. No aimless wandering here! Wright's
spiral walkway enl ists the force of gravity to urge the
visitor steadily downwards at a regular pace, past one
painting after another until the entire series has been
reviewed in an orderly fashion from start to finish.
One would need the legs of a mountain-climber to resist the gravitational pull and some stubbornness to ignore the pressure of the descending crowd. Thanks to
the mathematical regularity of its spatial organization,
the Guggenheim Museum concomitantly regularizes
the temporal structure of the viewing experience. Prolonged contemplation of any single picture is implicitly
discouraged, with the result that some cherished notions about art are called into question.
The winged museum, despite its tendency to classify
artworks, not only allowed the spectator a certain liberty of taste but also made concessions to popular interest in "the masterpiece" and the related notion of
"genius." Given sufficient holdings and adequate
space, the winged museum might devote an entire
room to the work of an individual artist and honor
some masterpiece by affording it conspicuous display.
The museum-goer could regard the great work from
any angle, from near or far, for a moment or an hour.
A bench--typically uncomfortable but a place to sit
nevertheless--wou ld often be located at an ideal point
for the leisurely scrutiny of a Leonardo or Rembrandt.
Contrarily, a museum like the Guggenheim tends to
eliminate the contemplative mode of viewing and, with
it, the experiential basis for attributing timelessness to
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a work of art. By restructuring the viewer's activity in
such a way that it becomes an orderly processing of
equivalent bits of information, the modern museum
systematizes esthetic experience. Un like the winged
museum and its precursor, the private collection, the
museum-as-system can dispense with trad itional legitimations for the accumulating of artworks. This
museum does not exist for the sake of embodying an
individual collector's tastes, preserving treasures of
natural or historic importance, exemplifying the encyclopedia of art history, paying homage to the works of
inspired genius. In the post-Guggenheim era, the
museum can and indeed must legitimize itself by the
criterion of optimal performance. 5
The criterion is simple: any given system can be said
to perform optimally when a maximum output is
achieved by a minimum input. Furthermore, the standard of efficiency or optimal performance is in the
way of becoming universal. "Performance is our most
important product": this slogan no longer applies
merely to the manufacture of light bu lbs but to the
products of every institution in our society.
Those of us in the field of education, for example,
have some awareness of how "the need for accountability" (academese for cost/benefit analysis) is affecting
traditional understandings of educational aims and
practices. The performance standard erodes the longestablished belief that the purposes of different un iversity departments are somehow incommensurable. Is
it more worthwhile to educate physicists or home
economists? Apples and oranges, you say. But given
equal benefits (output) there shou ld be equal costs
(input). Accordingly, there is increasing pressure on
universities to justify the existence of their most expensive programs in terms of the proportionally
greater benefits of these programs in relation to less
expensive undertakings. Need less to say, the criterion
of optimal performance has confronted educators with
difficu lt questions: if it costs the same to produce five
business majors or one physics major, should the same
tuition be charged in both departments? shou ld the
professor of physics and the professor of business earn
comparable salaries? shou ld the departments receive
equal fund ing for equipment? and so on.
It is not difficult to see the analogies with the
museum and the larger art world in which the
museum functions . Once upon a time curators and
museum d irectors could justify their budgets in terms
''My discussion of the performance criterion relies on jeanFran«;ois Lyotard, The Po;tmodem Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis,
1984). Lyotard's view of "post-industrial" or "technological" society avoids both the enthusiasm (McLuhan) and fear (Wiener,
Ellul, Bell ) of earlier critics by concentrating squarely on the
issue of the social control and dissemination of knowledge.
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of certain intangibles: public en lightenment, national
pride, the value of trad ition, the perpetuation of
esthetic beauty and truth , etc. These ideals have not
been cast aside utterly, but they too have come under
the sway of the performance principle. A museum ,
even when it is crammed with more art than it can display, is costly to operate. The Art Institute of Chicago
used to admit everyone free of charge; presently, admission is free only on Thursday. Even this single free
day would have been eliminated had it not been for a
recent grant from a corporate source.
What the charging of admission sign ifies is the
transformation of the museum-goer into a consumer,
one who has the right to demand that the museum
provide a "show" which is equivalent to comparably
priced entertainments. And from this standpoint, the
museum is a good buy-as rewarding as a White Sox
game and quite a bit cheaper. Yet the cost of admission would become much higher, despite the huge
grants from public and private givers, were it not for
the tremendous revenues generated by special exhibitions which attract very large crowds.
The role played by these exhibitions in the life of
the museum has some resemblance to that played by
a successful program-athletics, business, computer
science-in the life of a university. The "profits" from
an institution's most successful ope1·ation are allocated
among the poor performers, thereby making it possible for these inefficient operations to continue. Does
the physics professor include the football coach in
prayers of thanksgiving? Does the curator of the preColumbian collection feel gratitude for the impresario
who organized the Van Gogh exhibit? No doubt. But
beneath these cozy arrangements there are developments of a disquieting kind.
I was reminded of the problematic implications of
the performance criterion when I visited the Art Institute's show of Impressionist landscapes. "A Day in the
Country" was in man y ways an admirable exhibition.
True, there were some weaknesses-too many Monets ,
too few Cezannes, mediocre examples of Seurat-but
these were overshadowed by a wealth of fine paintings
and a few real surprises. Two superb landscapes done
by Gauguin prior to his departure for Tahiti indicated
that his pre-exilic work is of a much higher quality
than scholars are usually willing to allow. Camille Pissaro, typically not considered the equal of Monet and
Renoir, was represented wonderfully by the exhibition.
His landscapes demonstrated a graceful brushwork
and such harmonious integration of warm with neutral
tones as to make his more famous contemporaries look
garish by comparison.
I have the uncomfortable feeling, however, that my
singling out Gauguin and Pissaro for special praise is
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not at all in keeping with the spirit of the exhibition .
The show was crowded and guards or ushers were on
hand to encourage us to keep moving. "Don't look
back" was the watchword of the day as viewers were
gently reminded of the need to see everything in one
room, move on to the next, and avoid circling back. In
all of the several rooms there was hardly a bench to
be found, and the two or three I noticed were
positioned in recesses that afforded no view of the
paintings. Thus, the need to rest one's legs was conceded (grudgingly) but the opportunity for extended
viewing was ruled out absolutely.
My "day in the country" proceeded like those long

Soul
cannot hear her speak.
She appears to dream, gliding
over the cold, grey-brown water.
She is silent. To me,
Silence itself, asleep
in her own dreams.
Her hair moves . Awake,
she swims, her fins of green
peddling a cart through Brittan y.
Her fish-like body-siren
or mermaid-sleeps again,
a black nest of seaweed
curled into her own white arms.
Her green· legs one with the grass
on the hillside,
the Breton lay
she sings to herself.
Utterly still, the hand of a lady
in waiting, poised
on her mistress's book-yes,
tea at four-then
She retums to the deep desert
of her rest
Floating as on a still and
sacred pool
111 an ancient land.

Travis Du Priest
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lines of cars that slowly weave through Yellowstone
Park when all the campgrounds are full. I was meant
to see everything and to look at each painting for the
same brief amount of time rather than to dwell on this
or that beauty to the exclusion of the rest. The system
of crowd control used at "A Day in the Country" made
it clear that irregularities were incompatible with good
performance; and to pause or to backtrack would have
been to challenge the show's presupposition that all
the paintings-each "day" in the tour, so to speakwere of equal worth.
Money, they say , is the lifeblood of the economy and
must circulate freely. The economy performs best
when there is the maximum exchange of goods and
services among its several sectors. Dante's condemnation of hoar·ding and wasting became irrelevant to the
Keynesian era, when long-term deficits were deemed
acceptable by virtue of the increased liquidity they
made possible. The marketplace is ruled by the expectation of short-term gain, and for this to occur a r·apid
circulation of money is necessary.
In the world of art the analogue of cash is public interest. The interest of the spectator must be kept in
constant circulation, shifted from one novelty to
another and never permitted to invest itself in an exclusive, long-term manner. By extension, this principle
applies to the collector-whether individual or institutional-as well. The collecting of art is economically
profitable only under inflationary conditions; and a
collection, like any other inventory of goods, must be
"turned over" frequently. Permanent collections are
contrary to the spirit of speculative investment in art;
they are disadvantageous tax-wise and very expensive
to insure, to maintain properly, and to restore periodically. Today, neither museums nor private parties can
indulge in the luxury of sheer accumulation.
The fate of the museum in the post-Guggenheim
period is tied to momentous changes in the art world
generally, embracing the spectator, the collector, and
even the artist. For there is little reason for the artist,
who is no more exempt from the criterion of optimal
performance than anyone else, to labor slowly and
agonizingly over the creation of a tiny handful of masterpieces. True, the notion of a slowly ripening artistic
genius and the companion idea of gradually developed
connoisseurship may be nothing more than Romantic
mystifications, defenses against "commercialism" and
the "vulgarity" alleged to result from democratic dissemination of art.
Accordingly, the present situation is not without
some ambiguities. Museums must open new markets,
so to speak , and extend their services to larger communities. In order to meet the costs of their permanent collections, museums must pursue an active loan
April, 1985

policy and have frequent recour-se to important temporary exhibitions. And the more extensive the loans
to other museums, the greater in number and frequency become the special exhibits. On the positive
side , there is simply more art information becoming
available to more people. Yet the traveling shows must
be operated as efficiently as possible; that is , the
maximum number of spectators must view the art in
the minimum time. Under these circumstances the
museum-goer's duty is clear: he or she must keep
moving in order to ensure that the circulation of art
information is both rapid and complete. Those of us
who fee l comfortable with the winged museum and
enjoy leisurely excursions in this microcosm of the artistic past may regret the old girl's demise. But the
one-way traffic in the arts and the institutional arrangements which direct it are now predominant.
Must we r·esign ourselves, then , to a passive hope that
the traffic is heading in the right direction?

The fate of the museum in the postGuggenheim era is tied to momentous
changes in the art world generally.
In order to appraise this problem in the right spirit,
let's banish that scarecrow which reactionary critics of
modernity have posted in order to ward off intelligent
inquiry-! refer to the straw man of a dehumanizing
technology in the hands of a shadowy conspiratorial
elite. The creators of the Guggenheim and the organizers of "A Day in the Country" had no sinister designs; their intentions, on the contrary, were benign
and even lofty. 0 Neither can it be said that the general
effect of such museums and such shows is clear·ly dismaying to the museum crowd or implicitly anti-art.
Where then is the difficulty? The problem, which
can' be divorced from the wholesale acceptance of the
performance criterion, lies in the anxious avoidance of
the disruptive and stressful. In the wingless museum
and in the one-way show, emphasis is on flow and procedural continuity. I don't mean to suggest that diversity is not tolerated-the inclusion of Millet and SeUI·at
in the same show is proof to the contrary-but that
gaps, breaks, schisms, and ruptures are elided or
toned down in the interests of coherence and comprehensibility. What matters most is not so much the
"Lee Hall 's review of Joan M. Lukach's Hilla Rebay: In SeaTch of
the Spirit in Art indicates both the passionate devotion and the
eccentricity with which Guggenheim and his advisor Baroness
Rebay pursued the creation of their "Temple of Non-Objectivity." See 'The Passions of Hilla Rebay ," The New C1·iteriun 3, no.
2 (October 1984), 76-81.

17

efficiency of the performance, its goodness or badness
in relation to other performances, as its soothingly
programmatic appearance of a world without events.
The "Day in the Country" show announced by its
very title that, like the private Country Day schools favored by the upper middle classes, it offered sanctuary
from the unpredictable hazards of urban life. The
nearly uniform size of the canvases, the predominance
of summer scenes, the official assurance that these
were French Impressionist works, the pedestals for
bouquets of dried flowers-the only things missing
were a green carpet and, for each spectator, a slice of
bread and glass of wine.
Yet such arrangements, whatever temporary gratifications they afford, promote the values of showmanship over the facts of art history. There was nothing
to indicate how these plein-air paintings were achieved
in defiance of current norms for academic and studio
art. There was no hint of the battles between the Impressionists and contemporaries like Redon and
Moreau (and Gauguin, for that matter) who opted for
symbolism. The show's Franco-centrism did admit a
Whistler but ignored other Anglo-American painters;
and there were no representatives of Belgian , German,
and Russian Impressionism. The exclusion of paintings on the basis of narrow art-historical categories
(not landscape, not French , not Impressionist) imparted a sense of wholeness and harmony to the era
which would have surprised the Impressionists themselves.
Worst of all, perhaps , was the unremitting emphasis
on landscape conceived as a slice of rural life : does a
pa,inting cease to be Impressionist when it has the city
for its subject? The organizers gave a vote of no confidence in the spectator when they decided to exclude
the scenes of city life and architecture in which artists
like Degas, Sisley, the young Matisse, and even great
Monet himself accomplished what might be called the
Impressionist countrification of Paris and Rouen. To
judge from the show, one would think the paintings
had been clone by Mother ature instead of human
beings.
Americans, with their strange taste for pre-cooked
food and pre-interpreted art, are the natural audience
for cultural programs which communicate the serene
fluidity of a steadily evolving art history. For things to
be otherwise, for the one-way pattern to be replaced
by arrangements which give access to the widest horizons of imaginative experience, we need to acquire
greater respect for the power of events.
A one-way traffic in the arts, like other programmed
performances, denies that events have consequences
which are open-ended but ineversible. The Impressionists could not have guessed that their obsession
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with the effects of light in the open air would culminate in the abolition of landscape as a distinct subject
and genre of painting (Monet's waterlilies explode the
category), and yet they were willing to take large risks,
at once social and esthetic, for the sake of discovery.
Perhaps it is not too much to ask of our cultural institutions that they allow us to emulate such adventures and make our own way through the deserts and
mountains of art.
~=

New York, Lower East Side
Sally Fitzgerald lectures
on Flannery O'Connor
Outside the Catholic Worker
House on East Third,
the street quiets.
Panhandlers huddle
in stair wells, winos hunker
over heat grids, pushers
chart the alleys,
bag ladies rummage life
from lifeless matter.
Inside, to a Friday night
gathering, someone talks about
Flannery O'Connor
who never was
like anyone else.
Flannery did not misjudge
the ultimate resurrection
of the freak-prophet.
She knew grace triumphed
on the moon-crusted empire
of the devil ; that,
terrified, man is free
to become more human.
Listeners pull toward
the speaker, sit hard
on wooden chairs, staring
beyond the clark windows
where grace pours clown,
as always, violent.

Sister Maura
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Dierdre A. Burgman

"IN YOUR JUSTICE LIES OUR SAFETY"
Reflections on the Trial of John Peter Zenger

As we approach the Bicentennial celebration of the
United States Constitution in 1987, it is worth reflecting upon the observation of Gouverneur Morris, a
prominent statesman of the Revolutionary Period, that
American liberty is traceable to the 1735 prosecution
of John Peter Zengec That starting point makes 1985
the 250th anniversary of our liberty. If in fact our
freedom was ensconced here more than half a century
before the people of the United States undertook to
ratify a Constitution and a Bill of Rights, the prosecution of Zenger warrants serious consideration .
A German-born printer who came to this continent
as an indentured servant, Zenger published the first
issue of the New-York Weekly journal in November,
1733. Written under pseudonyms by some of ew
York City's leading lawyers, it was not just a newspaper; it was the only newspaper in the Colonies that
was pol itically independent. Other newspapers were
"official" papers, seldom reporting anything other
than what the government told them to report. By
contrast, Zenger's journal had as its raison d'etre opposition to the corrupt colonial Governor of New York,
William Cosby. Since the idea of an "opposition" newspaper was a novel one, the Journal justified its existence with interspersed essays on the subject of human
liberty generally and freedom of the press in particular.
This novel idea of an opposition paper could hardly
have been inspired by a ruler more worthy of opposition. Although Cosby had been removed from an ear-
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lier governing position for an act of dishonesty, he
would become known for his interference with the
political and judicial processes. Shortly after his arrival
in 1732, Cosby demanded a 50 per cent slice of the
salary of a local official; when the official refused,
Cosby sued him for the money. When Lewis Morris,
then Chief Justice of the ew York Supreme Court,
took a dim view of the lawsuit, Cosby simply removed
him from office. It was this arbitrary remova l that
spurred the protest against Cosby. Having mustered
political strength, Morris ran for the office of Assemblyman. Cosby attempted to steal the election from
him by instructing the sheriff that none of the votes
of the Quakers were to be counted. Despite this
wholesale disenfranchisement, Morris won anyway.
The first issue of Zenger's journal appeared a week
after this incident, by which Cosby had exposed himself at least a third time as a petty tyrant.
Among his many shortcomings, Cosby was wholly
unwilling to tolerate criticism. Even before the opposition newspaper appeared, he had been aware of widespread dissatisfaction and had sought to subdue it
through the officia l newspaper, the New York Gazette:
he appointed an editor to give a rose-colored tint to
the news stories and to withhold the news whenever
the rosey dye would not take. One of the Weekly journal's founders described the Gazelle as "loaded" with
"ridiculous flatteries" of the Governor. Predictably, the
ridiculous flatteries increased in direct proportion to
the revelations of the Weekly journal.
Cosby's anger also increased. In the first year of the
joumal's publication , he attempted twice to have grand
juries indict Zenger. When they refused, he ordered
the Attorney General to bring Zenger to trial by way
of "information," an accusation by a public officer
rather than an independent determination by a grand
jury after hearing evidence. The Attorney General
complied , charging Zenger with the crime of seditious
libel.
Seditious libel was a crime invented late in the sixteenth century by the most iniquitous tribunal in the
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history of England, the Star Chamber. From its earliest days, printing appears to have been regarded as
a threat to the English government; heresy and political dissent were viewed as virtually identical, and a
written or printed word was more dangerous than a
spoken word. Accordingly, printing eventua ll y became
regulated by the Star Chamber, which limited the
number of printers and presses and prohibited any
new publications unless approved under a licensing
scheme. To publish an ill word about the government
was made a crime , seditious libel. Moreover, because
the tendency to cause quarrels was the essence of the
crime, the statement's truth was no defense and might
even increase the seriousness of the transgression. Depending on the seriousness, possible punishments
ranged from fine or imprisonment to loss of one's
ears. By this method the Star Chamber, entrusted with
the security of the State, stifled criticism of the government.
When the Chamber was abolished in 1641, many
legal commentators of the period believed the crime
had been abolished too; but those who wished to see
government remain in control of political expression
suggested the law had survived its creator and cou ld
be enforced by other courts. In any event, the licensing scheme did prevail for another fifty-three years
after the Star Chamber had ceased to exist. It was during this period that the Puritans used the system to
control religious as well as political expression,
prompting Milton to write his Ar·eopagitica opposing
the licensing of the press. So-called "freedom of the
press" was established in England in 1694, but it
hardly approached our conception of that liberty:
there cou ld be no licensing, no previous restraints on
publishing, but an individual published at his peril,
subject to fine or imprisonment if the words were subsequently deemed unlawful.
Against this notorious background of abuse, Zenger
was brought to trial in 1735. Because bail had been set
at twenty times his net worth, he had spent ten
months in prison, during which time he had maintained steadfast silence regarding the identities of the
writers of his paper. He kept his newspaper going by
giving instructions to his wife and employees through
the door of his jail cell. Zenger's lawyers, William
Smith and James Alexander, were outstanding members of the New York Bar, and Alexander was the
chief writer of the Weekly journal. Both were already
well known to Cosby and had, in fact, represented the
defendant in Cosby's suit for a salary kickback. Their
first priority in representing Zenger was an attempt to
obtain a different judge for the case. They objected to
the power of Chief Judge James Delancey to hear it,
pointing out that he had been appointed improp-
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erly by Cosby and had already manifested extreme
hostility toward Zenger: the judge had encountered
Zenger on the street before his arrest and had vociferously rebuked him. Delancey responded to these arguments by disbarring both attorneys.
Nowadays it seems unimaginable that a single judge
could summarily preclude a lawyer from practicing his
profession, but the fact that it happened in 1735 gives
us some idea of the repressive climate of those times.
Our states today have systems for making determinations of professional misconduct after full hearings,
with opportunity for appeal; they judge conduct
against set rules and do not make ad hoc decisions. To
give a single judge the power exercised by Delancey
would inhibit all lawyers, and consequently no litigant
would ever be zealously represented. The rules by
which lawyers govern themselves require that they
represent their clients zealously, within the bounds of
the law.

The crime of seditious libel-printing

ill words about the government-was
invented by the Star Chamber late
in the sixteenth century. Truth was
no defense against the charge;
indeed, it might even increase the
seriousness of the offense.
It was zealous representation that Zenger needed,
and that gap was filled by Andrew Hamilton, a
Philadelphia lawyer almost sixty years old, who made
the hundred-mile trip to New York and took over the
defense without charge. A former Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, Hamilton was an eloquent, scholarly
man; he was undoubtedly the best lawyer in Pennsylvania and perhaps in all the Colonies. At trial Hamilton would explain that he had come because, while he
lived in a colony where Zenger's liberty would have
been respected, a bad precedent in New York could
jeopardize the rights of the people of Pennsylvania.
Believing it to be the right of every free man to
complain about government action, provided the statements are true, Hamilton conceded at the outset that
Zenger had published the papers, and he suggested
that the prosecution dispense with the witnesses by
which it intended to prove that fact. Under the prosecution's theory of the case, however, that was the
on ly element that had to be proved to the jury. Delancey agreed: the judge would decide whether the content of the Weekly journal had been libelous, for that
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was a question of law.
A distinction between questions of law and questions
of fact pervades our system of justice yet today, but we
candid ly recognize that if the right to trial by jury
means anything, it means the jury should decide whatever is within its competence. We recognize, in addition, that the line of demarcation between law and fact
is not clear-cut; indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has characterized the distinction as "vexing." Although we commonly speak of a formula whereby the
trial judge decides all questions of law, while the jury
decides all questions of fact, this is oversimplification.
When we say the jury decides the facts, we really mean
the jury applies the law to the facts it decides are true:
when a jury returns a verdict of "guilty ," it means,
"We believe the witnesses who say they saw the defendant do a certain act, and we believe that act fits the
definition of the crime charged." So, although the
legal definition of the crime is stated by the judge in
his instructions to the jury, the jury applies it to the
facts believed to be true. The "law" of the particular
case, which consists of the merger of law and fact, is
determined by the jury.
Notwithstanding this traditional division of labor,
there is also an Anglo-American tradition of a jury's
refusal to return a guilty verdict even when they believe the defendant committed an act, if the jurors believe the law is wrong in making that act a crime .
When jurors do this, they invade the power of the
judge by declaring, in effect, what they think the law
is or should be. Ill-advised as this may seem, it is insulated in criminal prosecutions by our prohibition
against double jeopardy: once a jury has found a defendant not guilty, he cannot be tried again for that
crime. To realize that in each case the jurors actually
have the power and opportunity to overrule the legislature's law is to understand the immense trust we
place in the judgment of a man's peers.
Like Englishmen, the American colonists regarded
this power to dispense justice as a treasured right, a
legacy of the magnificent Magna Charta. They were
familiar with the 1670 trial of William Penn, in which
the jury had played a most significant role. Penn was
arrested for delivering a sermon to a quiet assembly of
Quakers on a London street corner, having been prohibited from preaching in any building; he was alleged
to have preached "to the great disturbance of [the
King's] peace; to the great terror and disturbance of
many of his liege people and subjects." A member of
the assembly, William Mead, was also arrested, apparently to enable the prosecution to charge the men with
conspiracy. Their trial was a mockery of justice:
among other things, Penn and Mead were denied the
right to question their accusers. The jury, though orApril, 1985

dered by the court to convict the defendants, returned
a verdict of not guilty; the jurors were fined and imprisoned for doing so. This history gave added meaning to what the jury was to do in the case of John
Peter Zenger. It also demonstrates why Chief Justice
Delancey, puppet of the thin-skinned Royal Governor,
wanted to limit the jury's role to deciding merely
whether Zenger was the printer of the New-York Weekly
journal.
The scholarly Hamilton knew exactly how the prosecution would construct its argument on the meaning
of seditious libel, and he knew the puppet judge
would side with the prosecution and withhold as much
as possible from the jury. He therefore engaged in argument with the Attorney General which, while ostensibly made before the judge, was really directed to the
jury. Hamilton contended that truth of the printed
statements was a complete defense to the crime
charged; the Attorney General argued that if the statements were true, the crime was rendered even worse.
Each of these positions was supported by English authority. Hamilton pointed out, however, that the precedents cited by the prosecution were Star Chamber
cases; he said he had hoped those cases would have
died when that court was abolished. Delancey agreed
with the prosecution, ruling that because truth was no
defense, Zenger's witnesses could not testify that what
he had published concerning Cosby was accurate. Not
to be defeated, Hamilton turned to the jury, saying,
"You are citizens of New York; you are really what the
law supposes you to be, honest and lawful men . And
... the facts which we offer to prove were not committed in a corner; they are notoriously known to be
true; and therefore in your justice lies our safety."
The "safety" to which Hamilton referred does not
appear to have been the mere safety of himself and
his client. Assailing the breadth of the definition of
libel being urged by the Attorney General, Hamilton
argued that if libel were understood in that "large and
unlimited sense," there could scarcely be a writing that
would not be libelous, and scarcely any person would
be safe from prosecution as a libeler. When Delancey
ruled that the jury "may" decide only whether Zenger
published the papers, Hamilton responded, "I
know ... that the jury may do so; but I do likewise
know that they may do otherwise. I know that they
have the right, beyond all dispute, to determine both
the law and the fact; and where they do not doubt of
the law, they ought to do so."
In a brilliant tactical move, he adverted to the PennMead trial, impressing upon the jurors the magnitude
of their role and reminding them of the strength justice would require of them: like the Penn-Mead jury,
they could be subject to fine or imprisonment if they
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returned the "wrong" verdict. Worn down by Hamilton, Delancey finally relented to a minor extent, permitting the jury to apply the law if they insisted, but
giving them a definition designed to convict: he ruled
that if the jury did not leave the question to him, they
should apply a legal rule that the words were libelous
if they "tend[ed] to beget an ill opinion of the administration of the government."
Without question , the words contained in the Weekly
Jounwl did tend to beget an ill opinion of the government, yet the jury acquitted John Peter Zenger. That
day marked the eternal defeat of Cosby. The room in
which the trial was held was packed with onlookers,
and when the jury returned its verdict, three cheers
rang out from the crowd. The legislature restored to
Alexander and Smith their right to practice law, and
Zenger published their petitiOn in which they
explained all Delancey's abuses. The Common Council
of ew York ordered that Hamilton have the freedom
of the City, and it honored him for the service he had
rendered , not merely to Zenger but to the inhabitants of
New York, "by his learned and generous defense of the
t·ights of mankind, and the liberty of the press . ... "
Though history books tell us that Zenger's trial established freedom of the press in the Colonies, that is
a slight exaggeration. It is interesting to observe, however, that the Common Council's words were not so
limited; in fact, they mentioned other, unnamed rights
before freedom of the press. Perhaps what the Common Council contemplated may be gleaned from
Hamilton's statement to the jury that the issue before
them affected every free man living in the Colonies"the libeny both of exposing and opposing arbitnuy
power ... by speaking and writing truth." This notion
of the meaning of a free press comported with expressions in the Weekly joumal that free speech is the only
real assurance of freedoms: if the people cannot voice
their objections, all of their rights can be taken away.
Thomas Jefferson would later say that the only security is in a free pt·ess : "The force of public opinion
cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces must be submitted
to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure." This view
of the "primacy" of free speech still guides our Supreme Court in its interpretation of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Freedom of the press was, of course, written into
the First Amendment. We know that when it ratified
the Constitution-which at that point had no Bill of
Rights-the State of New York made its ratification
conditional on the addition of a free press amendment; and we know that the Framers of the Constitution were familiar with Zenger's case. The story of his
trial was printed in pamphlets which were distributed
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the Colonies and in England. The official English
law books reported his case with a caveat that the result was not the law of England, though the trial had
made "a great noise in the world. " It was not for many
years that the law of England would recognize either
of the principles for which Hamilton had argued-the
ad missibility of evidence of the truth of an alleged
libel and the right of the jury to judge whether a statement was libelous. The jury's verdict in Zenger's case
was the harbinger of an independence we rarely ponder: it was the popular, as distinguished from official,
declaration of an American law before there existed
an American nation.
Ironically, the hard-won freedom of the press was
nearly put to death only a few years after the First
Amendment was ratified . In 1798 the Federalists
passed the Sedition Act, a law banning "alien ideas ,"
which was enfm·ced against newspapermen , lawyers,
preachers, and others who dared to speak or write
critically of Federalist officials. The act effectively
made the old seditious libel a new American crime but
provided that truth was a defense. evertheless, Jefferson and James Madison fought against it. Madison,
the Father of the Constitution and the drafter of the
First Amendment, contended that the United States
might well have remained "miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke," had the Sedition Act been
in effect before the Revolution . The voters responded
by booting the Federalists from office in the election
of 1800. Because the issue was resolved politically, the
Supreme Court was not called upon to decide the Sedition Act's constitutionality.
Only twenty years ago, however, the high Coun
confronted an issue of immense importance to freedom of the press, and in so doing it looked back to
the Sedition Act and to the earlier crime of seditious
libel. The defendant was not a struggling immigrant
printer, but the New Yo·rk Times. And the lawsuit was
not a criminal case brought by the government to fine
or imprison the publisher; it was a civil case, and the
plaintiff was a government official suing in a private
capacity for monetary damages, claiming he had been
defamed by the newspaper. In the era of civil rights
protest, the Times had published an advertisement recounting the mistreatment of certain black students in
Montgomery , Alabama, and seeking contributions for
the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. L. B.
Sullivan, a City Commissioner who supervised the
police, claimed his reputation had been injured by the
ad, even though it did not name him and even though
it was inaccurate only in a few minor details. He
brought suit in his home state for half a million dollars. Alabama law required that damage (and therefore monetary recovery) be presumed from a false
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publication. And Alabama law was all that mattered ,
for the law of libel was governed solely by state law.
Notwithstanding the history of the free speech and
free press clauses of the First Amendment, the Constitution had not been held to put any restraints on
the state laws concern in g private defamation suits.
Yet the similarity of a private damages suit and a
crim inal prosecution becomes apparent when we stop
to consider why the colonists opposed the crime of
seditious libel. It was not simply that a person who
criticizes government should not thereafter go to jail;
what was troublin g about the crime was what is called
a "chilling effect"-a law that threatens punishment inhibits criticism. So, too, laws that threaten to impose
damage awards subdue free speech, making the publisher very cautious. While we want newspapers to give
us accurate information , we do not want them to hold
the news until they are certain that no one can possibly sue them .

Even as Zenger's jury established a
right to level accurate criticism at
government, so the Supreme Court in

New York Times v. Sullivan
established a right to be wrong. It
thereby helped preserve the nation's
newspapers from economic destruction.

For this reason a presumption of monetary damage
for any inaccuracy does not ensure a meaningful liberty of exposing and opposing arbitrary power.
Perhaps this is more easi ly understood when it is
pointed out that liability for libel cannot be escaped by
phrasing the publication, "Sources stated .. . " or "It
was rumored that .... " The words that fo llow such
prefaces are chargeable to the publisher. Of course, a
state cannot officiall y censor the press; that was decided by the Supreme Court in 1931. But that was not
the same question as that posed by New YoTk Times v.
Sullivan: What limitations, if any, did the Constitution
impose upon state laws governing libel suits in wh ich
the plaintiff was a government official?
The question was raised at the trial in Alabama, but
the judge wou ld have none of it. In some respects, the
trial there bore a resemblance to Zenger's: the Times,
for a ll its wealth, had trouble securing an Alabama attorney; and like Delancey, the judge gave a severely
narrowed question to the jury. That jury, unlike
Zenger's, returned the verdict the judge wanted,
awarding Sullivan the full amount claimed.
April, 1985

In a now-famous opini on the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court upholding the verdict. Recalling the
history of the liberty of the press and the political battle over the Sedition Act, the high Court considered
the case again st the background of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues shou ld be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." This commitment meant the First Amendment
contained no test for truth , and particularly no test
that required a defendant to prove his statements were
true, as Alabama's law required. "Erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate ," said the Court, "a nd [it]
must be protected if the f1·eedoms of expression are to
have the breathing space that they need to survive ."
Accordingly, the Court held that the Constitution
demands a ru le that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was fa lse. As Zenger's jury establi shed a right to level accurate criticism at government, New YoTk Times v. Sullivan established a right to
be wrong. It thereby helped to preserve the great
newspapers of this country from econom ic destruction .
Today, as libel suits become exorbitantly expensive to
defend, the legal system sti ll struggles with the question of how to preserve a liberty begun 250 years ago.
Moreover, the questions regarding First Amendment liberties still arise politically, as well as legall y,
and we have seen an example in the recent debate
over the extent to which religion may inform political
speech and so inform government. Legally, this is a
non-issue. The First Amendment protects and facilitates speech rega1·dless of its source, even if its source
is the Church. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
separation of Church and State does not preclude the
Church from criticizin g the State; in fact, a number of
cases ostensibl y involving religious rights have been
decided on the basis of free speech , the freedom to
speak on religious concerns being equated with political speech . The fact that religious freedom was placed
in the First Amendment with its secular brethren
suggests their common denominator was freedom of
conscience, and it further suggests an awareness that
the freedoms of speech and of religion are frequent
targets of oppression . In England the two types of oppression had gone hand-in-hand.
No one can say with certainty what this country's
destiny wou ld have been had seditious libe l become
the law in the various Colonies. Madison's surmise that
the American Revolution never would have occurred,
however, may well be correct. In that case, there
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would have been no Declaration of Independence, no
Constitution, and no Bill of Rights. The suppression
of speech and the persecution of religious groups
would have continued, with officia l newspapers and
official churches ruling hearts and minds with "ridiculous flatteries" of government. To appreciate the primacy of free speech-its ability to preserve all other
freedoms through the simple form of objection-is to
appreciate the contribution of a handful of people in
a ew York courtroom in 1735.
otwithstanding the gains we have made since
Zenger's time, it is difficult to study his trial without
experiencing a sense of loss. For one thing, our country has lost the respect for lawyers that the words of
the New York Common Council expressed for Andrew Hamilton. Of course, there are many reasons fo1·
that, and some of them have been brought on by
lawyer them elves. How many lawyers today would
travel to another state to render legal assistance without charge? Paradoxically, disrespect for lawyers in the
Un ited States began at about the same time as our
Constillltion was adopted. Jt was a reaction, not to
their money, their power, or the tricks of their trade ,
but to the heritage of English law with which they
worked. Many Americans wanted to be rid of that
heritage once the Rev.olutionary War ended; perhaps
Hamilton 's performance even helped to kindle the
flame. In any event, the "learned and generous defense" he provided seems a thing of the past, even
though lawyers are reminded by their code of ethic
that they are members of a "learned profession ," and
even though countless subsequent cases, including New
Y01·k Times v. Sullivan, have required the same cholarly
preparation and have contributed equally to th freedom of all, and not merely the lawyer's client. Unfortunatel y, we have come to view lawyers as the hired
guns of their own clients, ra ther than as defenders of
all our 1·ights.
Another kind of loss is just as disquieting. It concerns the way we view the jury: unlike the people of
Zenger's time , we speak of jury "duty" as a chore to
be avoided; we seldom, if ever, applaud a verdict; and
we never look upon jurors as overseers of law. We regard them as mere tools of the legal system, rather
than carpenters of justice. lt is only because of thi
modern viewpoint that we acquiesce in the notion of
a person's wanting to be relieved of jury duty. Approximatel y one century ago, the Supreme Court decided a case called Stmuder v. West Virginia, in which
a black defendant complained he had been denied a
fair trial because the state law had excluded all black
from his jury. The Court agreed he had been denied
his rights , but even more significantly, it viewed the
exclusion as a denial of the rights of the other black
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people in the community. The right to dispense justice, as distinguished from the right to receive it, is
easily forgotten ; the same oversight was made by the
New York Common Council when it honored Hamilton but not the jury.
But after all this time, we ought to pause and consider their achievement. When Hamilton stood before
Zenger's peers, he surely could not have foreseen that
their verdict would inform the drafting of the First
Amendment, the primary protection of so much freedom for so many. He did tell them, however, that
their conduct would entitle them to the blessing and
honor of all who prefer freedom to slavery. Knowing
they were at the mercy of a colonial government not
given to respecting rights, they exercised the one right
they could seize, the right to dispense justice. And in
their justice lies our safety.
Cl

Wasp Nest
Tonight, just after skimming stones
lnto our back yard maple, my son
Shut himself in our car and watched
The hail-angry wasps swarm out
To find a soft spot to punish.
And it was Shannon who skated
lnto their cloud, ignoring
His wolf-cry warning until she lay
Like a rear-view mirror victim,
Curled in the street and screaming
And taking the blame for her brother's
Stupid act.
They left her hair last;
They tangled themselves up close
To he1· scalp, and when J carried her,
Derek stared out through the glass,
A fish in air, understanding
This was crucial, water was not
To be found, that despite out minds
These hooks we strike will yank us
Up by the mouths.
What can we say,
Already busy with squirming,
Our hands at our faces as the sky
Presses down , spiked ceiling?

Gary Fincke
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Salieri's Mozart
Richard Maxwell
I went to see Amadeus at the
County Seat Mall in Valparaiso , Indiana. As the lights dimmed, the
muzak kept playing. An aged
Salieri cut his throat to "Raindrops
Keep Falling On My Head. " Underneath "Raindrops," Mozartian
tunes tried to hold their own. After
three or four minutes and several
representations from the audience,
the weather cleared . ow it became
evident that the much-touted Dolby
soundtrack had been turned down
and another controversy ensuednor was it the last. The audience
fought the good fight. It won repeatedly, though the enemy was already ready for one more surprise
attack.
· Listening to Mozart is usua ll y
easy. T he struggle to hear him at
Amadf'us was intense. Perhaps this
was not entirely the fault of the
projectionist. He may have caused
his share of difficulties, but so did
Peter Shaffer, the writer of the
film and of the play on which it
was based. What does it mean that
we have to see Mozart-and value
him-through the mind , the narrative, of a se lf-regarding mediocrity ?
This is the crucial question posed

Richard Maxwell teaches English at
Valparaiso University and writes regulm·ly for The Cresset on film.
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by Amadeus. Shaffer turns up the
muzak, as it were. His reasons remain elusive.
Amadeus is supposed to be about
artistic mediocrity confronting a rtistic genius. A so-so composer,
Sa lieri recognizes the greatness of
Mozart. His jealousy is compounded by a peculiar theory of
genius, which is taken to be an attribute doled out by God in arbitrary portions. Salieri has been a
good boy. He has prayed and
worked. Mozart runs around fondling girls or tellin g scatologica l
jokes (sometimes he does both
these things simultaneo usl y). God
must be hateful indeed to have
withheld genius from Sa lieri wh ile
a llowing it to this little German
turd. Sa lieri burns a crucifix , then
sets about persecuting his hum an
rival. All the time he wants to be
the man he hates.
Perhaps we can im agin e a
Browning-style dramatic monologue whose speaker e ntertains the
obsessions of Sa lieri. Browning
wou ld have set Sa lieri talking abo ut
hi s life and his relationship with
Mozart, wou ld have given him full
rein , but we wou ld not have lacked
a perspective on him. We would
have grasped the masochistic nature of Salieri's delusions without
the poet making an explicit judgment. We wou ld have h ad a way
in to Sa lieri's mind but also a way
out of it. I occasiona ll y got the feeling that Shaffer was trying for this
effect. The problem is that we
don 't know whether o ur a uthor assents to Sali eri's assumptions abo ut
genius. He often seems to.
Mozart comes off as a divinelyins"pired idiot (Sa lieri's view of
him), Salieri as the master of intricate ironies. The banality of
Sa lieri's ideas abo ut gen iu s is never
admitted. Shaffer ap pare ntl y believes that Salieri, whatever his talents as composer, is a sensitive critic, a great listener as well as talker.
How else could he have grasped

Mozart's historical significa nce so
promptly? Salieri is a llowed to confess his own mediocrity while displaying a sensibility so laceratin gly
fine that we a re compelled to
swoon an d flutte r along with him .
Rilke, thou shouldst be livin g at
this hour.
A sta nd a rd by which to evaluate
Shaffer's sc ript is Wolfgang Hildesheimer's Mozart ( 1977; English
translation, 1982). Hildesheim er's
book shares several qualities with
Amadeus. It is clever a nd playful. It
is not so much a biography as a
meta-biography, a commentary o n
previous lives of the composer.
This kind of reflexive writing is in
the air, of course, a legacy from
Borges a nd others in his generation , but how many uses it can
have! Shaffer's archness in reviving the old rumors about Salieri
a nd Mozart remains a theatrical device, nothing e lse. A d ecent professional actor could hardl y botch the
role of Salieri, th anks to the ingeniou s playwright. H ildes heimer's
meditations lead somew he re else.
T hey produce ideas, for examp le.

What does it mean that
we have to see Mozartand value him-through
the mind, the narrative,
of a self-regarding
mediocrity? This is the
key issue Amadeus poses.
Hild esheime r eve ntua lly suggests
that Mozart's erratic or crass behavior in public can be ex plained :
it was "loss of co ntact resulting
from transcendent inte llectual
achievement and compensation for
the loss in ways a nd places society
finds un expected." This formu laad vanced tentatively after severa l
artful stories within the stor y-pe rforms the same function as th e
character of Salieri in Amadeus: it
25
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highlights the discrepancy between
Mozart's everyday behavior and the
products of his imagination. Shaffer's Salieri, however, remains not
much mOl-e than a squawk of indignation. He is the eternal straight
man, eternally shocked at the great
man's mildly madcap behavior. Hildesheimer's thought is not such a
dead end. It gives us a real insight
into Mozart. We're not saddled
with the prudish love-hate retarded
aesthete. 1
It might be suggested that Hildesheimer's subtlety was not what
Shaffer was striving afte.-. His concentration is on Salieri , not on
Mozart. This objection won't have
much weight if we agree that
Salieri is defined in relation to
Mozart and that both characters
therefore count, that even the
Mozart of Amadeus cannot exist totally as a figment of Salieri's tortured dreams. The director of
Amadeus, Milos Forman , shows
signs of having grasped this difficulty: he incorporates into the film
certain powerful scenes which go
again t the grain of the original
stage play by circumventing
Salieri's dominance. Most striking
among these scenes at-e the excerpts from four operas by Mozart,
each serving to mark a significant
turn in the action.
We see Mozart towards the begmnmg of his stay in Vienna conducting The Abduction from the
Seraglio. He is having a good
time-really leaning into his work
and almost (across the orchestra
pit) into a luscious soprano who is
belting out a number from the
finale. The harmony between conductor and singer is complete. The
narrative gist of the scene is that
Salieri becomes irked-he knows in
his heart of hearts that Mozart has
1

Hild es heim er oilers a useful perspee1ive
on the title of Amrule11,1 by pointin g out
that Mozan never used this name except
in fun. Does ShafTer know this a nd i
th e iron y th e refm-e conscious )
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"had " the woman-but this point
tends to get lost. The playful staging of the opera (for which Forman
and Twyla Tharp are responsible)
takes precedence. Salieri's murky
quibblings are wiped out by the
brilliance of music and spectacle.
Subsequent excerpts from the
operas have much the same effect.
Among the operas represented
in Amadeus are The Abduction, The
MaTriage of Figaro, Don Giovanni,
and The Magic Flute. There is also
an elaborate parody of the finale
from Don Giovanni. Thi sequence
is the best. It is prepared for by
Salieri' commentary on Giovanni.
While watching the statue of the
Commendatore doom the Don to
Hell , Salieri realizes that the opera
is disguised autobiography. Mozart
is thinking about his relation to his
father , Leopold , whom he broke
with after marrying the moderately
lovely Costanze. Mozart is the impenitent rake, Leopold the avenging statue. Salieri is able to arrive at
this interpretation because he has
had a spy in the Mozart household
(a maid who is in his pay). He
thrills to have come so close to the
workings of genius. Has he really?
Hildesheimer argues at length that
auempts to discern autobiography
in Mozart's music lead nowhere ;
often more striking is the disjunction between life and art. To this
useful caution we may add James
Merill 's wordsLives of the Great Composers make it
sound
Too much like coo kin g: "Sore beset,
He put his bean's blood into that
quintet . . ."

Salieri is hungry not so much for
art as for the smell (and taste) of
blood. One might be ,-e minded of
the crackpot who shot John Lennon in order to e tablish a link , any
link, with him . The psychology is
familiar enough-in the twentieth
century, anyway-but as usual we
ca n't be sure what Shaffer thinks

of it. Are we supposed to thrill
along with Salieri at his momentous
discovery?
After all this folderol, the parody
version of the finale comes as a relief. A pantomime horse (instead of
the Commendatore's statue) comes
crashing through the stage set and
confronts the Don. Drum rolls
herald the production of champagne and doves from the horse's
anus. Everybody, including the audience , croons Zerlina's little love
song from earlier in the opera. At
first we wonder just what this extravagant mess could be: perhaps a
malicious fantasy of Salieri's-but
it's not malicious, and besides
Mozart is up in the balcony enjoying himself. Eventually it comes
clear that the parody Don Giovanni
has been written by Schikaneder,
Mozart's last librettist. We are being
given a way of assimilating genius
quite different from Salieri's. 2
Schikaneder is suggesting that we
roll around in Mozart's music like
pigs in a sty and enjoy ourselves.
This theory of art has its limitations, but in context it is refreshing.
There is only one moment in
Amadeus when Salieri gets out of
himself, when he stops preening
and starts enjoying. He has decided
that he will pretend to be Leopold
returned from the grave; he adopts
a masquerade outfit tha t Mozart
senior once wore and shows up at
Mozart junior's door where he
commiSSions the great R equiem.
(The R equiem was actually commissioned by a nobleman who wanted
to pass it off as his own-a much
more plausible secret commtsston ,
given the time a nd place.) Salieri
~A bit of th e same effect is produced by

the dream-wedding in Forman's best
movie.
Ha ir.
This
sequence-also
choreographed by Twyla Tharp-is the
most play ful nig htmare ever put on film:
a parody. a farrago, it vividly sums up
the fa scination of the la te 1960s as seen
from the perspective of a mid-American
farm boy. Of co urse, no Salieri dominates Hair. Even Lyndon Johnson remains in the back).{round.
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spooks Mozart all right-but the
game ends when his victim collapses at a performance of The
Magic Flute. Salieri takes Mozart
home and puts him to bed. Mozart
dictates a portion of the Requiem to
him. While trying to understand, to
get the notes on paper, Salieri loses
his torturing self-consciousness. All
he needed was a chance to play
Robert Craft: too bad he cou ldn 't
have waited for Stravinsky. This interlude is quite touching: David
Thomson, in an insightful article
for Film Comment, has compared it
to the conversation between Anthony Perkins and Janet Leigh in
Psycho, just before the shower
scene. Salieri, however, is unlike
Perkins/Norman Bates in one essential respect. He has lost his desire to persecute what he loves simply because he can't be it or have it.
A few minutes later Mozart dies
and Salieri freezes up again. No
doubt this is what Shaffer's Salieri
would do; he hasn 't had a long
enough escape from his sickness to
change his behavior permanently.
Nonetheless, Shaffer's cruelty to
his own creation is striking. The
situation is set up so that Costanze,
who has suddenly returned, abruptly throws him out. Everything
goes against Salieri-as if the limitless pity he feels for himself had
been confirmed by a final, definitive insult.
I couldn 't help but think of
another recent film about an
amanuensis, Celeste, on the unlikely
subject of Proust's housekeeper.
Having served her eccentric master
for many years (having taken dictation at the end, like Salieri with
Mozart) Celeste refuses to collapse
in on herself when Proust dies.
Somehow she carries away his life
with her. Eva Matte's brilliant performance makes this resolution believable and touching; Celeste is not
a hoked-up tour de force though it
might easily have become one.
Amadeus, by contrast, reverts at
April, 1985

the end to the creepy little ironies
on which so many of its previous
scenes have been based. The film
gets some mileage out of a scene
where Mozart's body is tossed in a
common grave, and a white powdery dust (quicklime) rises up
ghost-like. But the final words are
Salieri's: wheeled through the
madhouse where he now resides ,
he announces that he has become
the patron saint of mediocrities and
blesses us all accordingly. The
movie has forgotten its own best
moments.
And yet those moments are
there. Forman (Forman and Shaffer?) were right to open up
Amadeus, to let conflicting and distracting elements into it. 3 The original play has a dry perfection. Everything in it leads up to that smug
speech by the newly-canonized

saint. At least the movie gives us an
occasional alternative. It tries a few
moves which are more than pedantically clever and which lead us
away from the limited subject of
celebrity-worship towards the much
larger subject of Mozart's actual accomplishment. Similarly, Salieri is a
memorable character not because
of his nastiness but because of the
one time that he transcends it.
Amadeus received its Academy
Awards for addressing itself to a
culturally prestigious subject in the
terms of glib profundity. But it deserved the tribute for a different
reason.

••
••

" It is said that Forman and Shaffer holed
up in a Connecticut cabin for six months
while wrestling over the shape of the
film. Forman seems to have won-not by
decree, however, but by convi ncing
Shaffer that changes were needed.

Mother Is Grieving
Overhead, dull staccato of fist against pillow;
of books taken down and replaced, then rifled again;
of rummaging closets and drawers for something, oh
something that's scattered once more, like actors
confused with a script. Or children at recess.
Staccato subsides. Now tracking of moonfringe begins,
room after room to the wall where Jesus ignites, still
Walking on Water. Then, blessedly, silence. She's
mouthing her prayers. The eyes of the hunter are
closing this minute for answers.
But listen. Again
she's white plunging white into indigo sameness. Her
sobbing comes fierce as fluorescent now flooding upstairs
-and the cedars circle and whisper and bend toward her
windows to mimic her rocking and rocking, like that of a
rag doll, back and forth on the edge of the bed he left
empty, oh empty, without any warning.

Lois Reiner
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Manhattan
Melodrama
John Steven Paul
In Ma Rainey's Black Bottom, new
p laywright August Wi lson demonstrates that melodrama is sti ll the
way to a Broadway audience's
heart. Scintillating language and
brilliant ideas will never sell tickets
the way good guys and bad guys
will. Successfu l American playwrights know that once you've
created your framewor k of heroes
and villains, your victims and victimizers, you can fi ll it in with your
themes and meanings. Wi lson has
applied this axiom very well , and
Ma Rainey is a hit on Br·oadway.
Wilson's hero ("heroine" i · just
not a muscu lar enough word for
Ma) is Gertrude Rainey, a blues
singer who reached her peak of
popu larity in the 1920s. The play is
set in a seedy recording studio and
bandroom on a harsh March day in
Chicago when Ma is cheduled to
cut an album. T he h igh light of the
session promises to be a number to
which you can dance the "Black
Bottom," fittingly entitled "Ma
Rainey's Black Bottom." The villains are record-industry types who
are trying to exploit Ma, to get

j oh n Steven Pau l teaches in the Department of Speech and Drama at Valparaiso University and reports regulm·ly
on Theatre for The Cresset.
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every bit of marketable music out
of her as they can fot· as little
money as possible: Sturdyvant is a
record producer, Irvin is Ma's business manager. Did I mention that
Ma is black, and the producer and
manager are white?
Melodramas are about the di tribution of power in a given set of
circumstances. Vi llains look like they
have the power: a gangster's got a
gun, a land lord's got a deed , !ago's
got a handkerchief. In Ma Rainey's
Black Bottom, Sturdyvant and Irvin
sit up in the stud io control mom
with rea l power, electric power,
that they can witch off or on and
so determ ine whether Ma's music
gets to her public.
But Ma's the hero; she has her
own share of power. Her status as
a popular singer gives her the clout
that comes with being a commodity
in demand by paying customers.
She exercises he r· power with vigor .
turdyvam and Irvin spend a considerable portion of Act I preparing for her arriva l and fretting
over her tardiness. The white men
resent having to kowtow to a
woman they consider the ir inferior,
but they are confident of winning
ultimate victor·y by cashing in on
the singer's popularity. When Ma,
her lesbian lover Dussie Mae , and
her prissy nephew Sylvester finally
ma ke their entrance into the
studio, she is locked in boi temus
battle with one of Chicago's Finest,
who insist that Ma is responsible
for some automotive mayhem. One
look from the singer and Irvin is
crossing the policeman's palm with
enough money to get him to leave
in peace. Then it's one de lay after
another unti l Ma's got everything
just the way she wants it, including
the white men practically on their
knees begging her to sing.
The playwright has set Ma's singing at the very center of the p lay.
He makes the audience wait for
what they expect to be a stunning
performance and they are not dis-

appointed (except perhaps at the
limited amount of singing). Singeractress Theresa Merritt, who plays
Ma, delivers a powerful rendition
of "Ma Rainey's Black Bottom ,"
and some direct insight into the
source of Ma's power. For a few
moments voice and song neutralize
all villains. Together, actors and
audience celebrate Ma Rainey's
music and this story of blac ks and
whites becomes a tribute to an
American vocal artist.
As long as the voice is powerful,
everybody and everything wait on
it. Of course, Ma's power is strictly
lim ited by the boundaries of her
commercia l appeal. Her recording
career is contmlled by whites, who
intend to exp loit her talent as long
as it holds out. But Ma has her eyes
wide open to the reality of her situation. Her willingness to play the
exploitation game to her own advantage sets her above her adversaries, who think they've got her
cornered. When Ma walks out of
the studio with her fee fmm the
producer, she walks out a winner.

Scintillating language
and brilliant ideas will
never sell tickets on
Broadway the way good
guys and bad guys will.
There are two story lines in Ma
Rainey's Black Bottom. 1n order to
accommodate them, the stage at
the Cort Theatre has been divided
in ha lf. On the left is the recording
studio, on the right is the bandroom. Ma's experiences in the record ing studio make up the principa l p lot of the play: the me lodrama
in which she plays the hero and the
producer and the manager play the
vi llains . This is a broad ly written
and acted elrama, conceived in
serio-comic tones. Another, subtler
melodrama is going on in the
Tlte Cresset

bandroom. Ma's bandsmen are the
real victims of exploitation in the
drama. It IS on their half of the
stage that a disaster is waiting to
happen.
Ma Rainey has some control over
her own destiny; the men in the
band are powerless. They're lucky
to have a job that keeps them off
the cold, mean Chicago streets on
this March day. We are introduced
to the four musicians when they arrive at the studio early to rehearse.
Cutler, the trombonist and the
leader of the group, knows his job
is to take orders from Ma and see
that she gets the kind of instrumental support she wants. Toledo,
the pianist as well as the scholar
and philosopher of the quartet,
keeps a newspaper constantly open
on the piano top and keeps up a
trenchant commentary on the state
of the black man in America. Cool
and mellow Slow Drag, the bassist,
stays afloat on a wave of music and
reefer smoke. Levee's the trumpeter and new to the group. He is not
cool but hot, fired by a fierce desire for material things, for women ,
and for artistic recognition.
Ma Rainey's band is a memorable
creation . Wilson has drawn the
four bandsmen like the four voices
in a jazz quartet. Each is a unique
ueation of tone and rhythm. The
four musical instruments become
metaphors for the four characters.
Cutler is a professional musician
whose life is one of dedication to
task , respect for authority, and religious piety. Although life is hard
and unfair, there is a job that
needs doing, and Cutler is flexible
enough to get it done. He plays the
slide trombone. Old Toledo plays
the piano almost absent-mindedly.
Music has become a sideline. His
primary interest is the cultivation
of wisdom; he desires to rise above
the mundane concerns of those
younger than himself; he disdains
the needs and urges of his less educated brethren. Slow Drag seeks
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complete integ1·ation of life and
music, matching his own elemental
rhythms with the rhythm of the
blues. Levee's trumpet, like his
soul , is on fire. He is proud, ambitious, indignant, and the least
amenable to playing in an ensemble. To Levee, cooperating means
subordinating
his
individuality;
subordination, even for the sake of
music, feels like oppression. Levee,
like the others , has known too
much oppression, but his tolerance
for it is considerably lower than the
others'.

Ma Rainey's band is a
memorable creation.
Wilson has drawn the four
bandsmen like the four
voices in a jazz quartet.
Each is a unique creation
of tone and rhythm.
The compartmenta lized stage
structure recapitulates the power
structure. Sturdyvant and Irvin
take their places in the control
room high above the studio floor.
Ma and her entourage occupy the
studio itself, and the band is relegated to the shabby bandroom, several steps lower than the studio.
Cutler, Toledo, and Slow Drag resign themselves to staying on their
side of the stage, the bandroom,
until Ma or Sturdyvant calls them
to the studio. But Levee will not be
damned up in rehearsal quarters
for long.
Ma's power dominates the studio;
Levee's vitality animates the bandroom. The singer and the trumpeter neve1· confront each other directly, but the conflict between
them is real. Levee's got his own
ideas about how Ma's music shou ld
be played: the arrangements ought
to feature the trumpet. Levee's
dangerously fascinated by "Ma's
gal, " Dussie Mae . Most important,

Sturdyvant has promised Levee
that he is interested in the trumpeter as a composer rather than just
a backup musician. Based on this
promise, Levee is planning to
launch his own band and his own
career. But if Ma is destined to win
the battle in the studio, Levee is
doomed to be consistently rebuffed
in the bandroom.
The bandroom rings with repartee and the exchange of insults
among the musicians. The young,
hotblooded Levee is the focus of
much of the mockery. It is lighthearted, at first. Levee brags about
his emi nently superior arrangements of Ma's songs. The elder
Cutler instructs the younger Levee
about paying dues and about whose
band he's playing in: Ma's band.
Ma decides on the arrangements.
Ma may seek Cutler's advice, but
nobody else is invited to offer artistic counsel. Levee's got to understand that his musical aspirations
don't fit into the system. Levee
proudly polishes a pair of shiny
new shoes. Toledo chimes in, demeaning Levee's desires for affluence and recognition. Levee and
Dussie Mae take the opportunity of
a break in the session to engage in
some passionate necking, but when
Ma spots a spark of interest between the two she sweeps Dussie
Mae away. Ultimately, Sturdyvant
will crush Levee's hopes for his
own band by crassly offering him a
flat and pitifully small fee for the
compositions that Levee looks upon
as an essential part of himself.
As the conversations continue,
the sparring that began as meaningless mockery begins to take on a
more serious character as Levee
challenges Cutler's compromising
nature
and
derides
Toledo's
philosophy of self-improvement
through discipline, reserve, and restraint. In defending their views,
the men recall the formative experiences of their lives. In one particularly wrenching recollection,
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Cutler tells the story of a black
minister of his acquaintance. As the
resu lt of some confusion in trave l
arrangements, the minister found
himself alone, at night, in a white
ection of an unfam il iar Southern
town. Cutler is still woefully
amazed that a man of God, dressed
in clerical garb, cou ld have been so
bruta ll y harassed and assaulted. In
response , Levee marvels derisive ly
that God didn 't come to the aid of
one of his faithful servants.
It is in these speeches that p laywright August Wilson transcends
the conventions of melodramatic
form and renders the black experience in a series of prose poems.
T he stories are chronicles of injustice, insult, and degradation. If Ma
Rainey's story is in her song, CutToledo's,
and
Levee's
ler's,
speeches are spoken blues arias
that have an inherent rhythm and
musicality. Levee's own pain is
rooted in the rape of his mother by
a gang of whites. He has vowed to
revenge her, and his rage keeps his
trumpet simmering.

The stories the bandsmen
tell are chronicles of
injustice, insult, and
degradation endured by
Black Americans.
The spurning of L vee by Cutler, Toledo, Ma, and Sturdyvant
and his building resentment toward
them begin to gather ominous
momentum until it seems clear that
he will either despair or strike
back. When Sturdyvant condecendingly offers him the pittance
for his songs, Levee mutters and
steams, but maintains control. Sturdyvant pays the band and departs.
Then , as the four are gathering
their gear, Toledo accidentally
treads on Levee's new hoes . In a
moment, the trumpeter, enraged,
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deranged, and blinded by this t-elatively minor violation of his pet-so n,
rises up and fatally stabs Toledo. It
is a stunning moment. We might
have expected violence from Levee;
it is a part of his consciousness. But
that it should be directed toward
the gentle Toledo, a man devoid of
villainy, comes as an astounding
surpnse.
Until this moment Levee has apparently been able to manage his
rage. He ha been able to sublimate
it, using his horn to exorcise the
demon of his rage. But on this day
Levee's rage has been whipped to
an extraordinary level and he has
been denied the opportunity to
channel the angry energy into a socially acceptable activity. The rage
escapes 111 a pure, unmodified
form. When the white man Sturdyvant steps on Levee's music, Toledo, a black man who stepped on
his shoe, absorbs the rage in the
point of a knife.
Augu t Wilson's drama of music
and anger recalls another play that
premiered in New York a little
more than twenty years ago. In
fact, Ma Rainey's Black Boltom seems
to be a kind of illustration of LeRoi
Jones' (now Imamu Amiri Baraka)
1964 p lay Dutchman. The earlier
play, now a classic of 1960's revolutionary drama, is a threatening,
violent parable of black-white relations in an America that was about
to suffer the riots in Newark,
Watts, and Detroit.
Dutchman is an illusive and symbolic drama set in a ew York City
subway car in "the flying underbelly of the city." Lula, a white
woman who claims to be attracted
to black men, confronts Clay, an
educated and well-kept young black
man, with an act that mixes teasing
and taunting. She challenges him
to "do the belly rub," a particularly
sensual dance, with her in the subway car. When he refuses, the teasing turns to baiting. Lula calls Clay
out as an "Uncle Tom." She de-

rides his reserve and his attempts
to a simi late himself into a white
world. Fina lly, in a fit of rage, Clay
responds in a speech that resonates
111 August Wilson's play:
The belly rub? You wamed lO do
the belly rub? . . . Belly rub is not
Queens. Bell y rub is dark places, with
big hats and overcoats held up with
one ann. Belly rub hates you. Old
bald-headed four-eyed ofays popping
their fingers ... and don 't know yet
what they're doing. They say, " I love
Bessie Smith." And don't even understand that Bessie Smith is saying, " Kiss
my a_, kiss my black unruly a_." Before love, suffering, d esire, anything
)' OU can explain , she's saying, and very
plainly, " Kiss my black a_." And if you
don 't know that, it's you that's doing
the kissing .... Charlie Parker? Charlie
Pat-ker. All the hip white boys scream
for Bird. And Bird saying, " Up your
<L, feebl e-minded ol'ay!
p )'Our <L. "
And th ey sit there talking about the
tortured genius of Charlie Parker.
Bird would not have pla yed a note of
music if he just walked up lO East
Sixty-seventh tree t and killed the first
ten white people he saw. Not a
note! ... If Bessie Smith had killed
some white people, she wouldn't have
needed that musi c. [in Dutchman and
the Sla ve: Two Plays by Leroi J ones (New
York: William Mon-ow, 1964), pp. 3435.]

Once she has taunted Clay into
his tirade , Lula stabs him to death
and, with the help of the other
white passengers on the subway
car, throws him out onto the tracks.
Then she sits back and waits fOJher next victim. The language and
the stage images of Baraka's Dutchman come from another time, from
an America that seemed on the
verge of revolution. The play never
drew the kinds of audiences to the
Cherry Lane Theatre that Ma
Rainey's Black Bottom is drawing to
the Con, and yet the echoes of the
earlier play in the latter are instructive. August Wilson has leaped
back 111 time to that historical
period to which Baraka's character
refers, when Gertrude Rainey and
Bessie Smith (Rainey's contemporary) were singing black bottom
blues and, like the actors at the
Cort Theatre, were entertaining
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both blacks and whites.
So Ma Rainey's Black Bottom is
about music on a number of levels:
it is a celebration of a musical
genre, it is a tribute in the form of
a one-day biography of a musician,
it is about the way a certain kind of
music is born and functions as a socially acceptable outlet for rage,
and it is about the way music communicates different meanings to
different people.

Melodrama's moral
simplicity is its strength
and yet it is also the
feature for which it is
often held in contempt.
And it is of interest to note that
me lodrama itself was born as a fusion of drama and music in late
eighteenth-century France. Music
became a way for Parisian producers to infuse the drama, which had
ossified into a rigid neo-classical
relic,
with emotional content.
Melodrama was a species of popular cu lture, appealing to people
who were unable to find emotional
satisfaction in the musicali ty of the
Alexandrin couplet. At first, melodramas were structures of alternating episodes and melodies, but
soon music was played almost continuously
under
the
spoken
dialogue in order that the emotional content might be underscored and 1·einforced. In its most
common manifestations (and these
include the overwhelming majority
of American television and films) ,
melodrama is a form that functions
as a manipu lator of emotion at the
expense of intellectual inquiry.
Yet the form is best known for
the moral simplicity which is the
strength of melodrama and is also
the feature for which it is often
held in critical contempt. Perhaps
one shou ld say that it is when the
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issues of good and evil are clearest
that melodrama is the appropriate
form. There is no ambiguity in Ma
Rainey's Black Bottom; there is little
difficulty in discerning, or accepting, the playwright's meaning and
understanding of Ma Rainey's
world. Some things are unambiguously good: talent, ba1·d work,
music among them . Some things
are evi l: exploitation, discrimination , and oppression are among
them. Some people are unquestionably victims: Cutler, Toledo, and
Levee are among them. Some
people are victimizers: Sturdyvant
and Irvin are among them. And in
the racial melodrama of American
history, the simple, moral truth is
that the victimizers have been
white, the victims black.
The smashing of evil into good
inevitably produces energy, and it
is quite clear that when the energy
cannot be released with positive results, it will be released with negative ones. It is the traditional role
of the hero to arrive on the scene,
often just in the nick of time, to
preserve the good. This does not
happen in Ma Rainey's Black Bottom.
By the time Levee has shoved h is
knife into Toledo, Ma has been
gone with her money a long wh ile.

Ma is heroic, but on ly for the sake
of preserving herself. We cannot
boo her for her departure, but
neither can we cheer her. Yet even
without a hero or a happy end ing,
one knows whom to hiss when
viewing this p lay.
At the end we are left with a d isaster and a stage fu ll on ly of victims: To ledo dead, Levee bound
for imprisonment, Cutler and Slow
Drag deep ly saddened. And no
young Fortinbras to order Ham let's
body to be borne to the stage.
For me, the proof that August
Wilson has written a superb melodrama is that I found
its
emotio nalism so affecting. I was sitting in the front row of the Con
Theatre, a matter of a few feet
from the superb actors-Charles S.
Dutton as Levee , Robert Judd as
Toledo, Bi ll Cobbs as Cutler. During the cu rtain call , my good fee ling for them was mixed with the
unsettli ng rea lization that I, as a
white person, was a representative
of the vi llainous side of Wilson's
play. I wondered at what feeli ngs
must be behind the bright eyes and
proud smiles of the black artists
taking their bows on stage, having
just performed Ma Rainey's Black
Bottom with so mu ch co nviction.
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Speaking in
Tongues
Dot Nuechterlein
Recently I got a new clock-radio,
cheap. How cheap is it? Well ,
maybe you can get a clue to its
quality by reading some of the directions that came with it.
Automatic Switch On (Alarm)
The switch ( 12) must stay on
"auto" position, when you for the
switching on time, for example in
the morning getting up , like to be
awaken with radio. You can put
switch ( 12) to "auto/radio" position,
if you like to be awaken without
radio program, you can put switch
( 12) to "auto/buzzer" position, on
the switching on you can hear an
alarm tone .
Automatic Switching Off (Sleep)
You can prest the apparatus for
automatic switching off (sleep) up
to I hours 59 minutes for example
to fall as leep with music, or after a
transmission it can be switched off
automatically , the automatic switchin g off can be used with automatic
switching on or switched off apparatus.
Alarm Off
I t is two ways to stop the alarm.
First, is switching switch ( 12) "clock
function switch" to "off' position,
the apparatus will be turn off. Second, when alarm is warm-up, is
press switch (4) "alarm time" once
the apparatus will be turn off.

*

*

*

You're right: the a uthor of that
deathless prose speaks the lingo
through a vocab translation dictionary, and not too well at that. On
the one hand I am a bit ticked off
at the manufacturer of my clock32

radio for not spending a couple
more yen or yuan or won or whatever to run it past an Englishspeaker before settin g it in print.
On the other hand , however, reading that fl awed but functional factsheet reminded me once more of
the fascination of language and
human commun ication.
Think of it-by means of marks
o n a page or sounds in the air
meaning is transmitted from one
person to another. In fact, some
theorists suggest that the brain cannot develop fu ll y without learning
the language of the surrounding
cu lture, because without words
(symbols) there would be no way
for the mind to hold on to the images that come through the senses.
And that, they say, may be why
most of us cannot remember back
further in time than to about the
stage in which we became proficient in verbal skills: memory is anchored in thought-internal conversation-silently talking to ourselves in the words we have learned.
Trying to decode the symbols of
one language system into another
can never be precise, since communication patterns are shaped by
cu ltu re and primordial collective
experience, not shared alike by all
peoples. (Someone has said that
translation is something like trying
to duplicate a recipe when the
originator of the dish cannot, or
wi ll not, divulge the exact proportions of the secret ingredients
used .) Many of us have enough
trouble expressing ourselves satisfactoril y in our own native tongues,
let alone attempting to make sense
out of someone else's.
So at tim es we end up with
humorous resu lts. But whi le I sm ile
at the clock-radio directions, I do
not ridicule whoever wrote them;
no, I adm ire the effort, for I
myself am deaf and dumb in other
languages. Once upon a time I convinced the chaps who administer
doctoral exams that my German

dictionary and l cou ld, if forced,
find our way through a passage or
two, but I pray that my life never
depends on proving it aga in. Previously I had studied Greek, and earlier than that, Latin. (Of the latter
I recall not one word, but who
cou ld forget the ditty my high
school pals thought so clever:
"Latin is a dead language, it's plain
enough to see; it killed off all the
Romans, and now it's killing me"?)
Of course there are communication systems that are nonverbal. As
a recent college graduate I traveled
in Europe, bemoaning all the while
the fact that I had never learned
anything useful , like French or
Spanish. Sti ll , it was . cha llengin g
and fun to explore communicating
by smi les and signs and shrugs.
Then there was that gorgeouslooking traffic cop I approached
for directions upon getting lost in
Rome. After he pointed out the
way on my map, I had no trouble
at all understanding the additional
proposition he made to me in bedroom-eyed Italia n . Some things, apparently, are universal.
One of my grandfathers read
newspape t-s in a variety of languages; the other was so adept at
translation that he read English,
out loud and flowingl y, from German words. My children began
learn ing French when we lived in
Canada and now can exclude their
father and me from some of their
conversations. My appreciation for
their skills is ever so slightly tain ted
with envy; perhaps one of these
years I will get around to taking a
course and giving it a try myself.
Then again , perhaps I won't. I
seem to have enough headaches
these days reading English out of
English on the papers my students
turn in, and I a m not at all sure I
want to subject anyone else to the
pain of hearing me sound like
another Oriental clock-radio directions-giver. Tolerance and amusement can (on ly stretch so far.
Cl
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